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MILLER’S PROMISE: RE-EVALUATING EXTREME
CRIMINAL SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN
Nick Straley *
Abstract: Scientific, legal, and societal notions about youth have come together to
reaffirm an age-old concept—children are different and they change as they grow older. In
recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court has required courts and legislatures to take
a new look at extreme criminal sentences imposed upon children. Life without parole
sentences and decades-long, determinate sentences are constitutionally suspect when applied
to children because they fail to adequately account for the dynamism of youth. Miller v.
Alabama and Graham v. Florida announced two important principles: (1) that an extreme
sentence can only be imposed upon a child following an individualized hearing at which a
court considers myriad mitigating factors; and (2) that in the vast majority of cases, the child
should have a realistic opportunity for parole at some point in the future. During the recently
completed 2014 session, the Washington legislature took steps to address some of the
Supreme Court’s concerns, but work remains before Washington law fully incorporates the
principles laid out in Miller and Graham. Legal principles announced in the Court’s recent
cases require individualized sentencing hearings any time a child may be sentenced to
decades behind bars. Moreover, in no case should a child be sentenced to spend the rest of
his life in prison without some possibility of release in the future.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent psychosocial studies and neurological research have proven
that the structures and processes of the adolescent brain render young
people more reckless and more susceptible to negative familial and
societal pressures. 1 In a series of recent cases, culminating in Miller v.
1. See, e.g., ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE D. STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE
(2008) (discussing impact of neurological and psychosocial research on manner in which criminal
law addresses criminal behavior by young people); Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg,
(Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741 (2000) (presenting research showing that adolescents scored significantly
worse than adults in tests of responsibility, perspective, and temperance); Sarah Durston et al.,
Anatomical MRI of the Developing Human Brain: What Have We Learned?, 40 J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1012 (2001) (discussing various neuroimaging studies of
juvenile brain development); Neir Eshel et al., Neural Substrates of Choice Selection in Adults and
Adolescents: Development of the Ventrolateral Prefrontal and Anterior Cingulate Cortices, 45
NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 1270 (2007) (presenting neurological research showing that adolescents do
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Alabama, 2 the United States Supreme Court relied on this science and
recognized that, for young people, a confluence of immature judgment,
vulnerability, social pressure, and decreased ability to appreciate longterm consequences can create a toxic environment with tragic results.3
The chances for unthinking violence are exponentially increased when
homelessness, familial abuse or neglect, mental illness, and chemical
dependency are added to the mix. 4
However, because of their developing characters, children are also
uniquely able to transform themselves; they can change from foolhardy,
risk-seeking teenagers into mature, rehabilitated adults. 5 It is these
“characteristics of youth” 6 and the developing science that explains them
that animate the Supreme Court’s recent juvenile sentencing decisions.7
As discussed in those cases, physiological differences between teenagers
and adults carry constitutional significance and require that children be
sentenced differently—a principle firmly rooted in recent science and
longstanding legal distinctions between children and adults. 8
not utilize regulatory areas of brain during decision-making to same extent as adults); Laurence
Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed in Behavior and
Self-Report: Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1764 (2008)
(study demonstrating heightened vulnerability to risk taking among adolescents). The author relied
heavily upon amici curiae briefs filed in the Miller case for assistance with research and
understanding the scientific evidence. See Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n & the Am. Academy of
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Miller v. Alabama,
__ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) [hereinafter Miller AMA Brief]; Brief
for the Am. Psychological Ass’n et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Miller v.
Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) [hereinafter Miller APA
Brief].
2. __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
3. Cf. id. at 2468–69 (discussing before the Court details of the boys and their crimes).
4. Alan Kazdin, Adolescent Development, Mental Disorders, and Decision Making of Delinquent
Youths, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 33, 47
(Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000); see generally Terrie E. Moffitt, AdolescenceLimited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100
PSYCHOL. REV. 674 (1993) (examining antisocial behavior among adolescents and interaction of
neuro-psychological development and criminogenic environments).
5. The author uses the terms “youth,” “juvenile,” and “child” interchangeably throughout this
Article to refer to people under the age of eighteen. As discussed below, in the vast majority of
circumstances, the law and society treat all such people as “children.” Cf. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464
(“[C]hildren are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Because juveniles
have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, we explained, ‘they are less deserving
of the most severe punishments’” (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)).
6. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.
7. Id. at 2469; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.
8. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (“[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to
show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”); id. at 71 (“A sentence lacking
any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense. With respect
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In Part I, this Article analyzes Miller v. Alabama, 9 Graham v.
Florida, 10 and Roper v. Simmons. 11 Part II explains the science
underpinning those decisions. Part III shows how that science helps
explain why the men currently serving life without parole in Washington
for crimes committed as juveniles came to reside in prison. Part IV
argues that the principles announced in Graham and Miller apply with
equal force to long determinate sentences imposed upon children. Part V
discusses how Miller and Graham track a growing societal disfavor for
extreme punishments for youth. Part VI examines how the Washington
legislature responded to this changing legal and social landscape during
the 2014 legislative session when it fundamentally altered the sentencing
structure applicable to children who commit serious crimes. Finally, Part
VII discusses what else courts and the legislature should do to fully
realize Miller’s promise.
I.

THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS RECOGNIZED THAT
CHILDREN MUST BE SENTENCED DIFFERENTLY THAN
ADULTS

In a trilogy of recent cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that
juveniles differ from adults in their psychosocial and neurological
makeups and therefore must be sentenced differently—even when those
children have committed heinous crimes. 12 In 2005 in Roper v.
Simmons, 13 the Court extended the categorical rule it set out in
Thompson v. Oklahoma 14 barring the death penalty for children under
the age of sixteen, to any person who was under the age of eighteen at
the time of the crime. 15 While Roper announced a number of important
principles, the true impact of those newly articulated constitutional rules

to life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, none of the goals of penal sanctions that
have been recognized as legitimate—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—
provides an adequate justification.” (citation omitted)).
9. 132 S. Ct. at 2455.
10. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
11. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
12. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (holding it is unconstitutional to impose mandatory lifewithout-parole sentences on juvenile offenders); Graham, 560 U.S. at 74–75 (holding it is
unconstitutional to sentence youth to life without parole for non-homicide crimes); Roper, 543 U.S.
at 559–60 (holding it is unconstitutional to sentence youth to death).
13. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
14. 487 U.S. 815 (1987).
15. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (2005).
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awaited further development in Graham and Miller. 16
The Court heard arguments in Graham v. Florida, a case that
presented the question whether children can be sentenced to life without
parole for non-homicides, in the fall of 2009. 17 In an opinion authored
by Justice Kennedy, the Court ruled that imposition of such sentences in
cases in which no one was killed violated the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 18
The Graham Court expanded upon the discussion begun in Roper that
the unique attributes of children require that they be sentenced
differently than adults. As in Roper, the Graham Court accepted recent
scientific breakthroughs that explain why young people are inclined to
engage in risky, anti-social behaviors; how peer pressure and poor
familial circumstances more dramatically affect them; and how—given
expected neurological development—many of them will outgrow the
irresponsible, unthinking acts which lead them to prison. 19 The Graham
Court noted, “‘juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified
among the worst offenders.’ A juvenile is not absolved of responsibility
for his actions, but his transgression ‘is not as morally reprehensible as
that of an adult.’” 20 Because children change as they age, a constitutional
sentencing structure requires that a “juvenile offender [be given] a
chance to demonstrate growth and maturity.” 21 Life without parole
sentences violate this tenet by removing any chance that a child will one
day again walk the world as a free person, no matter how well he may
have done while behind bars. 22 Graham therefore required that any child
convicted of a non-homicide crime be provided a “realistic opportunity
to obtain release” at some point in the future. 23
Miller v. Alabama presented the Court with the next question in the

16. The Court in Roper extended the categorical rule it set out in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815 (1987), barring the death penalty for children under the age of sixteen, to all children.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.
17. Graham, 560 U.S. at 74–75.
18. Id. at 75.
19. Id. at 68–69.
20. Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835).
21. Graham, 560 U.S. at 73 (“Even if the State’s judgment that Graham was incorrigible were
later corroborated by prison misbehavior or failure to mature, the sentence was still disproportionate
because that judgment was made at the outset.”); id. at 75 (“A State is not required to guarantee
eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the State must do,
however, is give defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”).
22. Id. at 69–71.
23. Id. at 75.
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sequence: whether children who commit murder can be sentenced to
mandatory life without parole. 24 In a few paragraphs, the Miller Court
referred to the lengthy discussions in Roper and Graham of the science
and its relevance to the constitutional analysis the Court must
undertake. 25 As the Miller Court explained, these cognitive and
physiological differences are constitutionally relevant in three ways: (1)
juveniles are less able than adults to control and understand the
consequences of their actions; (2) juveniles are more likely than adults to
be affected by negative influences in their lives; and (3) juveniles are
uniquely capable of rehabilitation and reform. 26 These differences render
children less culpable than adults and more likely to change for the
better. 27
The Graham and Miller Courts also recognized that life without
parole sentences are uniquely severe when applied to children. 28 By
virtue of their younger ages, children sentenced to life without parole
will, on the whole, serve more years behind bars than adults condemned
to the same fate. 29 Moreover, they will be subject to greater levels of
abuse and hardship while incarcerated because of their particular
vulnerabilities. A recent report from the National Institute of Corrections
indicates that in 2005 and 2006 between ten and twenty percent of the
victims of inmate-on-inmate sexual violence in U.S. jails were under the
age of eighteen, even though they represented only one percent of all jail
inmates. 30
A life without parole sentence imposed upon a child constitutes an
irrevocable decision, one taken without sufficient information about the
person that child will become. As Justice Kennedy noted in Graham:
[L]ife without parole sentences share some characteristics with
death sentences that are shared by no other sentences. The State
does not execute the offender sentenced to life without parole,
but the sentence alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is
irrevocable. It deprives the convict of the most basic liberties
without giving hope of restoration . . . . [T]his sentence “means

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

__ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
Id. at 2464.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2466; Graham, 560 U.S. at 70–71.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 70.
JASON ZIEDENBERG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., YOU’RE AN ADULT
NOW: YOUTH IN ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 11 (2011), available at http://static.nicic.gov/
Library/025555.pdf.
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denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character
improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the future
might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he
will remain in prison for the rest of his days. 31
Given their more limited culpability, their greater rehabilitative
capacity, and the uniquely severe consequences of life sentences upon
children, the Court found life without parole sentences for children to be
tantamount to death sentences. 32 As in Graham, the Miller Court
recognized that because of their developing minds, and because of the
harshness of life without parole sentences, children cannot be sentenced
in the same manner as adults and should rarely face the same
punishment. 33
These two factors—the severity of life without parole and the
particular qualities of youth—prohibit the sentencing of a child to life in
prison without the possibility of parole if the mitigating factors of youth
and the child’s upbringing require a lesser sentence. 34 The Court
explicitly adopted the rationale from its extensive death penalty
jurisprudence in its decisions regarding extreme sentences for children.35
And like the death sentence, the Court commanded that a life without
parole sentence be imposed rarely and only after an exacting analysis. 36
Unwilling at that time to categorically ban life without parole sentences
for children who commit murder, the Miller Court prohibited the
imposition of such a sentence absent an individualized sentencing
hearing. 37 At this hearing, a court must consider evidence that mitigates
against condemning the child to die behind bars. 38
The Court in Roper, Graham, and Miller relied upon a wealth of
relatively recent neurological and psychosocial research in finding that
children must be sentenced differently than adults. 39 An understanding
31. Graham, 560 U.S. at 69–70 (third alteration in original) (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d
944, 944 (Nev. 1989)); see also id. at 70–71 (“Life without parole is an especially harsh punishment
for a juvenile. Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a
greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender. A 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each
sentenced to life without parole receive the same punishment in name only. This reality cannot be
ignored.” (citation omitted)).
32. Id. at 69–70; see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463–64.
33. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2466–67.
36. Id. at 2468–69.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–65; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Roper v. Simmons,
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of the science is therefore crucial to grasping the fundamental shifts in
juvenile sentencing the United States Supreme Court has been recently
exploring.
II.

NEUROLOGICAL AND PSYCHOSOCIAL RESEARCH
PROVES THAT CHILDREN ARE LESS CULPABLE AND
MORE LIKELY TO CHANGE THAN ADULTS

Adolescents’ behavioral immaturity mirrors the anatomical
immaturity of their brains. To a degree never before understood,
scientists can now demonstrate that adolescents are immature, not only
to the observer’s naked eye, but in the very fibers of their brains. 40
Psychosocial and neurological advances prove that juveniles act
impulsively, react rashly, and engage in risky behaviors without
appreciation for the potential consequences due to psychological and
anatomical immaturity. 41 The same impulses that compel youth to
explore, experiment, and learn through experience also compel them to
engage in risky, sensation-seeking behaviors. 42
The physiology of the teenage brain is fundamentally different than it
will be later in adulthood. The dynamic nature of this development
accounts for a great deal of the behavioral changes children exhibit as
they age. 43 Perfectly normal neurological development renders teenagers
more likely to engage in socially destructive and risky behaviors. 44
The prefrontal cortex—the region of the brain that controls the
“executive functions,” including emotional regulation, impulse control,
working memory, risk assessment, and the ability to evaluate future
consequences—is one of the last neurological structures to fully
develop. 45 Once mature, the prefrontal cortex modulates impulsive
543 U.S. 551, 617–18 (2005).
40. Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) [hereinafter Roper AMA Brief].
41. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–65; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.
42. Miller APA Brief, supra note 1, at 5; see also Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 741,
747–49, 754 & tbl.4; Steinberg et al., supra note 1, at 1774–76.
43. See Eshel et al., supra note 1, at 1270–71; Kathryn L. Modecki, Addressing Gaps in the
Maturity of Judgment Literature: Age Differences and Delinquency, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 78,
79–80 (2008); Steinberg et al., supra note 1, at 1765.
44. Moffitt, supra note 4, at 685–86; see also Miller APA Brief, supra note 1, at 7 (reckless
behavior “is ‘virtually a normative characteristic of adolescent development’” (quoting Jeffrey
Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL
REV. 339, 344 (1992))).
45. See Miller AMA Brief, supra note 1, at 17–19; Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence
for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE
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behavioral urges emanating from other earlier developing regions of the
brain, like the amygdala. 46 However, the prefrontal cortex remains
structurally immature until early adulthood, around the mid-twenties. 47
Until that time, adolescents’ decision-making and responses to stimuli
are largely directed by the amygdala and other more primitive
neurological regions. 48 As the brain develops through adolescence and
into early adulthood, the communication between regions of the brain
improves, allowing complicated information to flow more freely and for
areas of the brain associated with higher-level reasoning to begin to
assert more control. 49 While developing structurally, teenage brains also
produce an imbalance of dopamine and serotonin, the neurotransmitters
that regulate pleasure and the desire for rewards. 50 The interplay
between these various neurological structures and processes causes
correspondingly stronger desires for immediate pleasure and
859, 860 (1999).
46. See Miller AMA Brief, supra note 1, at 27; Ralph Adolphs, The Human Amygdala and
Emotion, 5 NEUROSCIENTIST 125, 125–26 (1999). The amygdala evolved early on to detect danger
and produce rapid protective reactions, the “fight or flight” reflex. Abigail A. Baird et al.,
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect Recognition in Children and Adolescents,
38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 195, 195 (1999).
47. See Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During
Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 8174, 8177 (2004).
See generally Miller AMA Brief, supra note 1, at 17–27 (discussing current scientific understanding
regarding how the brain develops as children age into adulthood). Two separate processes are
involved in the development of the prefrontal cortex. First, the brain undergoes what is colloquially
known as “pruning.” Unused and redundant synaptic pathways begin to close down. Though fewer
in number, the remaining neural networks become stronger and more efficient. Durston et al., supra
note 1. Second, the brain begins to produce a greater abundance of myelin, a neural network
insulator that allows electrical messages to move more effectively throughout the brain. See
ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES AND THE CIVILIZED MIND 144
(2001).
48. See Miller AMA Brief, supra note 1, at 29–32; Eshel et al., supra note 1, at 1271.
49. Miller AMA Brief, supra note 1, at 27 (discussing evidence that “development of top-down
effective connectivity from cognitive control regions is critical in supporting active inhibitory
control” (quoting Kai Hwang et al., Strengthening of Top-Down Frontal Cognitive Control
Networks Underlying the Development of Inhibitory Control: A Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging Effective Connectivity Study, 30 J. NEUROSCIENCE 15535, 15543 (2010))).
50. B. Luna, The Maturation of Cognitive Control and the Adolescent Brain, in FROM
ATTENTION TO GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR: NEURODYNAMICAL, METHODOLOGICAL AND
CLINICAL TRENDS 249, 258 (Francisco Aboitiz & Diego Cosmelli eds., 2009); R. Andrew
Chambers et al., Developmental Neurocircuitry of Motivation in Adolescence: A Critical Period of
Addiction Vulnerability, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1041, 1046 (2003); Laurence Steinberg,
Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 459, 466 (2009).
Researchers theorize that this neurochemical imbalance plays an important role in reinforcing
learning in adolescents. Dustin Wahlstrom et al., Neurobehavioral Evidence for Changes in
Dopamine System Activity During Adolescence, 34 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 631,
643 (2010).
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gratification in adolescents, while also rendering them less able to resist
those heightened urges. 51
This observable neurological immaturity plays out in psychological
studies and controlled observations of teenage behavior. Teenagers score
significantly lower than adults on assessments measuring “impulse
control” and “suppression of aggression.” 52 Even youth who have
developed cognitive abilities similar to adults do not have the same
ability to self-regulate their behaviors, modulate their emotions, or
weigh the consequences of their actions. 53
The combination of a developing brain and the psychosocial tendency
toward risk, impulsivity, and limited judgment often results in criminal
conduct. Studies have shown that it is statistically typical to engage in
some form of criminal behavior during adolescence. 54 These behavioral
patterns are particularly acute for teenagers in groups. Adolescents
commit crimes in groups at a much greater rate than adults.55 The
presence of peers increases the likelihood and seriousness of risky
behaviors beyond what a teenager acting alone would undertake. 56 By
contrast, adult behavior is not significantly impacted by the presence of
peers. 57
As the Miller Court recognized, these scientific truths have a direct
51. Miller AMA Brief, supra note 1, at 29–30 (the differing timing of development in various
areas of the juvenile brain means that “adolescents experience increasing motivation for risky and
reward-seeking behavior without a corresponding increase in the ability to self-regulate behavior”).
52. Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 749, 754 tbl.4; see also Miller APA Brief, supra note
1, at 9–10.
53. Miller APA Brief, supra note 1, at 6; Steinberg, supra note 50, at 467. The areas of the brain
that regulate cognition and logic develop relatively early in adolescence; gains in cognitive
capability plateau at about age sixteen. See Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand
Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 333, 333–34 (2003); Daniel Keating, Cognitive and Brain Development, in HANDBOOK OF
ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 45, 64 (Richard Lerner & Laurence Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2004).
However, social and emotional maturity continues to develop well into early adulthood. See
Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 756. In other words, teenagers have the neurological
foundation to support logical, rational thinking, but lack self-restraint and the ability to fully
comprehend consequences, especially in emotionally charged settings. Id. at 743–45; see also
Bonnie L. Halpern-Felsher & Elizabeth Cauffman, Costs and Benefits of a Decision: DecisionMaking Competence in Adolescents and Adults, 22 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 257,
264–71 (2001).
54. Moffit, supra note 4, at 685–86; see also L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related
Behavioral Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 417, 421 (2000).
55. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 39.
56. Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and
Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 625, 632 (2005).
57. Jason Chein et al., 14 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. F1, F2 (2011).
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impact on the applicability of criminal sanctions to children:
“[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to
show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult
minds”—for example, in “parts of the brain involved in behavior
control.” . . . [T]hose findings—of transient rashness, proclivity
for risk, and inability to assess consequences—both lessened a
child’s “moral culpability” and enhanced the prospect that, as
the years go by and neurological development occurs, his
“deficiencies will be reformed.” 58
Juveniles are uniquely susceptible to negative influences in their lives
because of their psychosocial and neurological immaturity. Troubled
family lives, limited educational achievement, and poor neighborhood
conditions are highly correlated with youth who commit homicides, 59 as
is early experimentation with drugs and alcohol. 60 Neurologically based
impulses towards risk and reward-seeking behaviors—and the
accompanying lack of forethought—combine with abuse, chemical
dependency, mental illness, and other negative environmental factors to
cause some youth to act violently. 61
Because of their emotional immaturity and tendencies towards risk,
teenagers have been granted very little legal autonomy over their own
lives. 62 These realities render youth “‘more vulnerable . . . to negative
58. Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464–65 (2012) (quoting Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48, 68–69 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)); see also Graham, 560
U.S. at 68–74 (developments in brain science and psychology reveal fundamental differences
between adult and juvenile minds that require that children be subject to different sentences than
adults). While the Miller and Graham rulings involve life without parole sentences imposed upon
children, the Court’s rationale would seem to apply to any criminal sentence that is imposed equally
upon children and adults. If a child who commits murder is less culpable than an adult convicted of
the same crime, then similarly, a child who steals should be treated less harshly than an adult. The
Miller Court’s rationale requires a significant reevaluation of not only the most serious criminal
sentences, but of sentencing of any child in the adult system. See infra Parts V and VI.
59. See ROLF LOEBER & DAVID P. FARRINGTON, YOUNG HOMICIDE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS:
RISK FACTORS, PREDICTION, AND PREVENTION FROM CHILDHOOD 61 (2011).
60. Lawrence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003).
61. Kazdin, supra note 4, at 47. See generally Thomas Grisso, Adolescent Offenders with Mental
Disorders, 18 FUTURE CHILD. 143, 143 (2008) (showing linkage between mental disorders in
juveniles and increased risk of impulsive and aggressive behaviors that lead to criminal justice
system involvement).
62. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (“It has been noted that ‘adolescents are overrepresented statistically
in virtually every category of reckless behavior.’ In recognition of the comparative immaturity and
irresponsibility of juveniles, almost every State prohibits those under 18 years of age from voting,
serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent. The second area of difference is that
juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including
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influences and outside pressures,’ including from their family and peers;
they have limited ‘contro[l] over their own environment’ and lack the
ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.” 63
The Miller Court recognized that the natural attendant characteristics
that all juveniles share, and the particular family and social
circumstances of individual youth, can lead to awful violence. 64 It
illustrated this point by discussing the particulars of the crimes and
circumstances before it. 65 The Miller Court noted that the two
petitioners, Evan Miller and Kuntrell Jackson, were both fourteen years
old at the times of their crimes. 66 Jackson and two other boys attempted
to rob a video store. 67 One of the other boys shot and killed the clerk. 68
Jackson was sentenced to life without parole for his role in the crime. 69
In reviewing the facts of his crime, the Court found that Jackson’s young
age “could well have affected his calculation of the risk” of following
his armed friend to a video store “as well as his willingness to walk
away at that point.” 70 Moreover, the Court highlighted Jackson’s
difficult family life and “immersion in violence” as relevant
psychosocial factors that contributed to his actions. 71
Turning to Evan Miller, the Court pointed out that the fourteen-yearold’s stepfather abused him, his drug-addicted mother neglected him,
and that he grew up in foster care. 72 The abuse and dysfunction led him

peer pressure. ‘[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a
person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.’ This is explained in part
by the prevailing circumstance that juveniles have less control, or less experience with control, over
their own environment.” (quoting Arnett, supra note 44, at 339; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 115 (1982))).
63. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458 (alteration in original) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569). The law
also imposes particular restrictions upon the freedoms of children that often place them at the mercy
of abusive family members without the power or autonomy to adequately protect themselves.
Government agencies tasked with protecting children are often unable to provide appropriate and
timely assistance because of limited resources and large caseloads. The lack of available state
support is particularly acute for teenagers involved with abusive families. For many teenagers,
homelessness is the only realistic alternative to remaining in households dominated by physical or
sexual abuse. NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, HOMELESS YOUTH 1 (2008).
64. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458.
65. Id. at 2461–62.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2461.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2468.
71. Id. at 2468–69.
72. Id. at 2469.
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to attempt suicide on at least four occasions, his earliest attempt in
kindergarten. 73 And while his crime was terrible, his reduced culpability
and limited prior criminal record required a court to reevaluate his life
without parole sentence to ensure imposition of an “appropriate
penalty.” 74 These negative influences and mitigating factors are qualities
of youth that courts must take into account when deciding whether to
impose long criminal sentences upon children. 75
The psychosocial and neurological evidence also proves another
important truth: children change. As explained by the Miller Court,
because “a child’s character is not as ‘well formed’ as an adult’s; his
traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be evidence of
irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].” 76
The incidence of violent criminal behavior generally peaks during
adolescence and falls off in young adulthood. 77 In fact, the vast majority
of youth outgrow criminal behaviors, and it is impossible to determine
during childhood which child is truly incorrigible. 78 Put simply, no
accurate means exist to predict whether any particular youth will
continue to commit violent acts as an adult. 79 “Assessing
adolescents . . . presents the formidable challenge of trying to capture a
rapidly changing process with few trustworthy markers.” 80 This
scientific fact requires that the prospects for rehabilitation be considered
before children are sentenced to life terms 81 and explains why children,
irrespective of conviction, should be provided some real opportunity for
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2469.
76. Id. at 2464 (alterations in original) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2010)).
77. Arnett, supra note 44, at 343; Moffitt, supra note 4, at 675 fig.1; Terrie Moffitt, Natural
Histories of Delinquency, in CROSS-NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH ON HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 3, 29 (Elmar Weitekamp & Hans-Jurgen Kerner eds.,
1994).
78. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 1014–15; see also Kathryn C. Monahan et al.,
Trajectories of Antisocial Behavior and Psychosocial Maturity from Adolescence to Young
Adulthood, 45 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1654, 1654–55 (2009); Moffitt, supra note 4, at 685–86.
79. State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 55–56 (Iowa 2013) (quoting SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note
1, at 54) (“[I]t is very difficult to identify which juveniles are ‘adolescence-limited offenders,’
whose antisocial behavior begins and ends during adolescence and early adulthood, and those who
are ‘life-course-persistent offenders’ whose antisocial behavior continues into adulthood.”); Edward
P. Mulvey et al., Trajectories of Desistance and Continuity in Antisocial Behavior Following Court
Adjudication Among Serious Adolescent Offenders, 22 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 453, 468–70
(2010).
80. Edward P. Mulvey & Elizabeth Cauffman, The Inherent Limits of Predicting School Violence,
56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 797, 799 (2001).
81. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468–69.
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release from prison at some point during their lifetimes. 82
Given this science, traditional rationales supporting criminal
sanctions—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—
apply with less force to children than to adults. 83 Retribution is less
compelling with children because their more limited ability to control
criminal behavior and understand emotional impulses renders them less
culpable than adults. 84 Similarly, children are less likely to be deterred
by criminal sanctions because “their immaturity, recklessness, and
impetuosity—make them less likely to consider potential punishment.” 85
Furthermore, incapacitation does not justify life without parole sentences
for youth because “[d]eciding that a ‘juvenile offender forever will be a
danger to society’ would require ‘mak[ing] a judgment that [he] is
incorrigible’—but ‘incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.’”86 And
finally, barring a child from ever living outside a prison’s walls
“forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.” It reflects “an irrevocable
judgment about [an offender’s] value and place in society, at odds with a
child’s capacity for change.” 87 Rationale that may support life sentences
for adults do not similarly support long sentences for children.
III. THE MEN SERVING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
DEMONSTRATE HOW THE SCIENCE PLAYS OUT IN THE
REAL WORLD
As demonstrated by the circumstances of their crimes, many of the
men serving life without parole for crimes committed as children
exhibited the hallmark features of youth: immaturity, impetuosity, and
failure to appreciate the risks and the consequences of their actions. 88
More than half of the men serving this sentence in Washington State
82. Cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68–71 (2010).
83. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 73).
87. Id. at 2465 (quoting Graham, 569 U.S. at 74). This discussion of the traditional rationale
behind criminal sentences in Miller follows on from the Court’s analysis in earlier cases. See, e.g.,
Graham, 560 U.S. at 71–74 (discussing how penological justifications regarding sentencing are
significantly different when applied to children).
88. There are currently thirty men serving life without parole sentences for crimes committed as
children. WASH. STATE DEP’T OF CORR., OFFENDERS IN CUSTODY THAT WERE SENTENCED TO
LWOP PRIOR TO TURNING 18 YEARS OF AGE [hereinafter DOC JLWOP INFORMATION]. One other
man, Ansel Hofstetter, was sentenced to life without parole as a child in 1992. Recently the Pierce
County Superior Court resentenced him to a determinate forty-year term. See discussion infra notes
123–125 and accompanying text.
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were sixteen years old or younger at the time of their offenses.89 Barry
Massey was thirteen years old at the time of his crime and was one of
the youngest people ever sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole in the United States. 90 Three others were only fourteen years
old. 91
Experts who evaluated the then thirteen-year-old Barry Massey
described him as “passive and naïve;” a child who lacked the capacity to
appreciate the consequences of his actions. 92 He and a fifteen-year-old
boy killed a store owner during the commission of a robbery. 93 Barry’s
co-defendant became involved in the robbery that ended in murder to
steal fishing equipment, food, and money so that he could “live off the
land” and support himself, after learning that his father was leaving for
Germany to get married. 94 After his arrest, Barry indicated that one of
his life goals was to overcome his fear of the dark. 95
As in the Massey case, peer pressure played a role in a number of the
other murders that led to life without parole sentences for children. In
several instances, the boys committed their crimes with teenage or older
peers. 96 Six of the youth had adult co-defendants, two of whom received
significantly lower sentences than the child. In a number of instances,
the fellow youthful co-defendant received a much shorter determinate

89. See WASH. COAL. FOR THE JUST TREATMENT OF YOUTH, A REEXAMINATION OF YOUTH
INVOLVEMENT IN THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN WASHINGTON: IMPLICATIONS OF NEW
FINDINGS ABOUT JUVENILE RECIDIVISM AND ADULT BRAIN DEVELOPMENT 12–13 (2009)
[hereinafter COALITION REPORT], available at http://www.columbialegal.org/files/JLWOP_cls.pdf.
The Washington Coalition for the Just Treatment of Youth, a coalition of organizations that work
with children, reviewed the case files and other available information related to most of the men
currently serving life without parole for crimes committed as children in Washington. Much of the
data discussed herein can be found in the Coalition’s report and findings. The report identified
twenty-eight adolescents serving life without parole for crimes committed as children. Following
the report’s publication, new information provided by Department of Corrections (DOC) indicated
that there were an additional two men serving juvenile life without parole in addition to those
discussed in the Coalition Report.
90. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14-YEAR-OLD
CHILDREN TO DIE IN PRISON 20 (2008).
91. COALITION REPORT, supra note 89, at 13.
92. See Psychological Evaluation of Barry Massey by Norma D. Tropp, Ph.D. 4 (Mar. 27, 1987).
Some of the information to which the authors refer herein is unverified and based upon reports from
the men themselves.
93. Judgment & Sentence, State v. Massey, No. 87-1-01354-7 (Pierce Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct.
Aug. 5, 1998).
94. Source document held on file with Columbia Legal Services.
95. Id.
96. COALITION REPORT, supra note 89, at 16–17 (a number of the children offended with other
juveniles or with adults).
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prison sentence. 97 In some cases, a younger child may have been
influenced by older co-defendants. 98 Other cases raise questions about
the youth’s degree of planning and participation in the crime. 99
Because of their immaturity, youth are also “at a significant
disadvantage in criminal proceedings.” 100 As Justice Kennedy noted,
“[d]ifficulty in weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding
impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust defense counsel seen as part of the
adult world a rebellious youth rejects, all can lead to poor decisions by
one charged with a juvenile offense.” 101 Most children lack the
autonomy and understanding to protect themselves or seek assistance
upon their involvement with the criminal system. 102
Many of the twenty-nine men serving juvenile life without parole in
Washington had little-to-no experience with the criminal justice system
at the time of their arrests. Roughly one-third of them had no prior
criminal history before being sentenced to life without parole. 103
Available records indicate that not one defendant had ever been
transferred out of juvenile court until being charged with the offense for
which he is currently serving life without parole. 104 Moreover, less than

97. Id. at 17.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 16 (“[A] number of these youth were charged along with co-defendants and therefore
had varying levels of participation in the crime.”). This is not to suggest that these men do not
deserve punishment for their participation in these terrible crimes. The seriousness of their crimes
must be taken into account when determining an appropriate sentence and when evaluating whether
they should be eligible for release. In fact, it may be appropriate to continue to incarcerate some or
all of these men for more time. As discussed in more detail later, individual sentencing hearings and
parole eligibility provide appropriate means to balance the myriad factors and reach a just result.
100. Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012) (quoting Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48, 78 (2010)).
101. Graham, 560 U.S. at 78.
102. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (mandatory life without parole for juveniles “ignores that [the
youth] might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies
associated with youth”); see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 78 (“[T]he features that distinguish juveniles
from adults also put them at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings. Juveniles mistrust
adults and have limited understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles of the
institutional actors within it. They are less likely than adults to work effectively with their lawyers
to aid in their defense. Difficulty in weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding
impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust defense counsel seen as part of the adult world a rebellious
youth rejects, all can lead to poor decisions by one charged with a juvenile offense. These factors
are likely to impair the quality of a juvenile defendant’s representation.” (internal citations
omitted)).
103. COALITION REPORT, supra note 89, at 16 (“A third of the . . . adolescents were first time
offenders with no prior juvenile or adult record.”).
104. See Judgment & Sentence, State v. Alexander, No. 02-1-00527-9 (Whatcom Cnty. Wash.
Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 2004); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Thang, No. 98-1-00278-7 (Pierce Cnty.
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half committed prior offenses serious enough to be calculated in their
offender scores at the time of their sentencings. 105 As a result, many
were unprepared to understand the adult criminal justice system or
operate in a sophisticated manner within it. A number of the boys were
questioned by police, and in none of the cases did the boys have either
an attorney or even a parent present during the interrogations. 106
Donald Lambert’s case highlights the vulnerabilities of youth within
the adult criminal justice system. Accused of two counts of aggravated
first degree murder, he agreed to the juvenile court’s decline of
Wash. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2003); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Phet, No. 98-1-03162-1 (Pierce
Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. June 28, 2002); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Lembcke, No. 01-1-00001-7
(Stevens Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2001); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Leo, No. 98-103161-3 (Pierce Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Anderson,
No. 97-1-00421-3 (King Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 2000); Judgment & Sentence, State v.
Baranyi, No. 97-1-00343-8 (King Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 15, 1999); Judgment & Sentence,
State v. Backstrom, No. 97-1-01993-6 (Snohomish Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 1999); Judgment
& Sentence, State v. Munguia, No. 97-1-00679-5 (Benton Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. July 10, 1998);
Judgment & Sentence, State v. Lambert, No. 97-1-00415-5 (Grant Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Dec. 10,
1997); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Loukaitis, No. 96-1-00548-0 (Grant Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct.
Oct. 10, 1997); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Weaver, No. 96-1-00123-9 (Whatcom Cnty. Wash.
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1997); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Skay, No. 95-1-01942-5 (Snohomish
Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 1996); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Comeslast, No. 95-1-022601 (Spokane Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. June 28, 1996); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Bassett, No. 951-00415-9 (Grays Harbor Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 1996); Judgment & Sentence, State v.
Boot, No. 95-1-00310-0 (Spokane Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Mar. 21, 1996); Judgment & Sentence,
State v. Ngoeung, No. 94-1-03719-8 (Pierce Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. June 27, 1995); Judgment &
Sentence, State v. Haag, No. 94-1-00411-2 (Cowlitz Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 13, 1995);
Judgment & Sentence, State v. Delbosque, No. 93-100256-4 (Mason Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Oct.
10, 1994); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Gaitan, No. 93-1-01018-0 (Yakima Cnty. Wash. Super.
Ct. Dec. 21, 1993); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Gilbert, No. 92-1-00108-1 (Klickitat Cnty.
Wash. Super. Ct. June 7, 1993); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Bourgeois, No. 92-1-06444-4 (King
Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 1993); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Hofstetter, No. 91-1-02993-0
(Pierce Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 1992); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Rice, Jr., No. 88-100427-2 (Yakima Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 1990); Judgment & Sentence, State v. McNeil, No.
88-1-00428-1 (Yakima Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 1989); Amended Judgment & Sentence,
State v. Furman, No. 89-1-00295-5 (Kitsap Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 9, 1989); Judgment &
Sentence, State v. Massey, No. 87-1-01354-7 (Pierce Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1988);
Judgment & Sentence, State v. Stevenson, No. 87-1-00011-5 (Skamania Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct.
June 12, 1987).
105. See supra note 104 (judgments and sentences demonstrating that less than half of defendants
committed prior offenses that were calculated into their offender scores). An offender score is the
calculation of the defendant’s criminal history used as part of the sentencing range calculation.
W ASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.525 (2012). The offender score and the seriousness of the crime
determine the sentencing range. See id. § 9.94A.530(1) (“The intersection of the column defined by
the offender score and the row defined by the offense seriousness score determines the standard
sentence range . . . .”); id. § 9.94A.510 (standard range sentencing grid). The higher the offender
score, the longer the criminal sentence imposed upon a particular defendant. Id.
106. COALITION REPORT, supra note 89, at 14 (“[I]n every case where the youth was questioned,
not one had a parent or attorney present during interrogation by the police.”).
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jurisdiction without a hearing. 107 In preparing for trial, Lambert’s
attorney did not hire an investigator or investigate Mr. Lambert’s
background or the backgrounds of his co-defendants who were
scheduled to testify against him. 108 Shortly after the start of his trial,
Lambert engaged in a hasty discussion with his attorney. After this
discussion he pled guilty to aggravated first degree murder, and accepted
a sentence of life without parole even though he was not eligible for a
more severe sentence; a plea which offered him “no benefit.” 109 He was
sentenced to life without parole that afternoon. 110 Had his attorney done
any investigation, he would have discovered that Mr. Lambert had
suffered lifelong problems as a result of his mother’s alcohol abuse
during pregnancy. 111
Collectively, the family and home environments of Washington’s
juvenile lifers were abysmal, marked by abuse and neglect, chemical
dependency, homelessness, and other negative forces. Seventy-one
percent of them had significant substance abuse problems as teenagers;
forty-three percent suffered from mental illness; sixty percent reported
experiencing abuse or severe neglect; and sixty-eight percent had been
homeless at some point during their childhoods. 112 Additionally, many of
these children had parents who suffered from mental illness or substance
abuse, were murdered, or were incarcerated themselves. 113 The majority
107. Lambert v. Blodgett, 248 F. Supp. 2d 988, 993 (E.D. Wash. 2003), rev’d in part, 393 F.3d
943 (9th Cir. 2004).
108. Id. at 1000.
109. Id. at 1002. Mr. Lambert’s attorney was subsequently disbarred after the Washington State
Supreme Court determined that he had “engaged in many different kinds of misconduct, involving
many different clients, over a prolonged period of time.” In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against
Romero, 152 Wash. 2d 124, 136, 94 P.3d 939, 945 (2004). Mr. Lambert’s youth probably played a
role in his inability to challenge his attorney or recognize the poor representation he provided.
110. Lambert, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 993. Procedural barriers have barred Mr. Lambert from
receiving any post-conviction relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. See Lambert, 393
F.3d at 943.
111. Lambert, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 1000.
112. COALITION REPORT, supra note 89, at 14–15. A national study of people serving life without
parole for crimes committed as children mirror these results from Washington. See ASHLEY NELLIS
& THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL
SURVEY 2–12 (2012) (forty-seven percent of 1579 people serving juvenile life without parole who
responded to survey reported being victims of physical abuse, seventy-nine percent reported
witnessing violence in their homes before entering prison, eighty-five percent had been suspended
or expelled from school, and almost sixty percent had at least one incarcerated parent).
113. COALITION REPORT, supra note 89, at 15 (though available information is limited, records
showed that fourteen percent of the youth had at least one parent with mental illness, thirty-six
percent had a parent with chemical dependency, eighteen percent experienced foster care, seven
percent had at least one parent murdered, and twenty-one percent had at least one parent in prison).
Each of these risk factors increases the likelihood of juvenile criminal behavior. For example,
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of the boys also battled serious educational deficits, developmental
delays, or learning disabilities. 114 At the times of their crimes, only a few
of them were on track to graduate from high school and many had
completely dropped out of school—one as early as the fourth grade. 115
While their young ages and troubled childhoods do not excuse their
crimes, the experiences of three of the men—Michael Furman, Barry
Loukaitis, and Michael Skay—illustrate the trauma and circumstances
many of the men serving life without parole sentences faced as children.
Michael Furman was born into a life of physical and sexual abuse,
addiction, and violence. Michael was sexually abused as a child and was
getting high with his uncle at thirteen. 116 After discovering that his father
was sexually abusing his sister, Michael dropped out of school at fifteen
to protect her. He and his siblings were thereafter placed in foster
care. 117 At the time of his offense, he was high on methamphetamine and
other drugs. His addled state of mind, when combined with his already
diminished capacity and limited forethought, probably influenced the
decisions he made before and during his crime. 118
Barry Loukaitis suffers from bipolar disorder and severe depression,
and he was likely delusional when he entered a junior-high classroom
with a gun, killed a teacher and two other students and injured
another. 119 While grappling with their son’s mental illness, Barry’s
children with parents in prison are five to six times more at-risk to become involved in the criminal
justice system. Keva M. Miller, The Impact of Parental Incarceration on Children: An Emerging
Need for Effective Interventions, 23 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK. J. 472, 478 (2006).
114. COALITION REPORT, supra note 89, at 14 (“A quarter of the youth functioned in the low
average range to borderline mentally retarded range at the time of the crime. Records also indicate
that another eighteen percent showed indications of developmental delays, including provision of
special education services.”). Developmental delays exacerbate the difficulties these youth had in
navigating the criminal justice system. Id. (discussing one case in which psychologist testified that
confession of youth was likely false as a result of developmental delays and police interrogation).
115. Id. at 15 (“One dropped out of school in the fourth grade; eleven others only made it through
grades in middle school. Several of the youth bounced around from school to school—one was in as
many as fourteen schools by the eighth grade. Another dropped out in the eighth grade so that he
could stay home to protect his sister from being molested by his father. Despite the young age at
which these youth left the school system, their departures appear to have gone unnoticed.”).
116. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR., CRIMINAL HISTORY SUMMARY REGARDING MICHAEL FURMAN
(2005).
117. Id.
118. Cf. State v. Furman, 122 Wash. 2d 440, 445, 858 P.2d 1092, 1096 (1993) (relating an expert
witness’ testimony that Furman’s use of methamphetamine made him unable to reflect or deliberate
about the mechanics or consequences of his actions).
119. Judgment & Sentence, State v. Loukaitis, No. 96-1-00548-0 (Grant Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct.
Oct. 10, 1997). The sentencing court recognized that Mr. Loukaitis suffered from mental illness at
the time of his crime. The court recommended that Mr. Loukaitis receive treatment while in prison
for his serious mental health disorders. Id.

12 - Straley_Ready for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/9/2014 9:24 PM

982

[Vol. 89:963

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

parents divorced and his mother became suicidal. Diagnosed with
bipolar disorder herself, Barry’s mother often threatened to kill herself in
front of Barry, including telling him her plan to kidnap his father and his
new girlfriend and force them to watch her commit suicide. These
threats continued up to the period directly before his crimes. 120
Michael Skay’s mother was a prostitute and chronic drug abuser who
often left him alone for days on end from the time he was an infant.
Michael did not meet his father until he was ten years old, upon his
father’s release from prison. One of his mother’s live-in boyfriends
physically and psychologically abused Michael, his siblings, and his
mother. After the family moved out-of-state to escape the boyfriend’s
violence, the man stalked them, repeatedly threatening Michael’s
mother’s life. The man eventually murdered her only one year before
Michael and an older co-defendant murdered an acquaintance and threw
his body in a Snohomish County river. 121
Furman, Loukaitis, and Skay experienced horrific childhoods before
they turned on their victims. Similar stories of abuse, chemical
dependency, and mental illness can be found in the records of other
juvenile offenders. 122
Many of the men currently serving life without parole illustrate the
degree to which rehabilitation is possible as children age and become
adults. Barry Massey and others have taught and counseled newly
arrived inmates on how to take steps to change their lives in order to
prosper upon release. 123 Herbert Rice was sentenced to life without

120. Peggy Andersen, Loukaitis’ Mother Says She Told Son of Plan to Kill Herself, SEATTLE
TIMES, Sept. 8, 1997, at B1.
121. Memorandum of Defendant Re: Sentencing, State v. Skay, No. 95-1-01942-5 (Snohomish
Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 1996).
122. A few of the men were sentenced before the Washington State Supreme Court outlawed
application of the death penalty to children in 1993. See Furman, 122 Wash. 2d at 440, 858 P.2d at
1092. In a few other cases, courts held pre-trial declination hearings in order to decide whether to
transfer the child from juvenile to adult court. See, e.g., State v. Massey, 60 Wash. App. 131, 135,
803 P.2d 340, 343 (1990). Court records contain some information regarding these men because of
the development of some mitigation evidence as part of death penalty or declination proceedings.
However, even though some information may have been considered by courts at the time of the
original sentencings, these cases arose before the development of the new neurological science that
supports Miller’s holding and the analysis it requires. Moreover, the Miller Court explicitly found
that the evaluation of mitigating evidence during a declination process to adult court is not sufficient
to support a life without parole sentence for a child. Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455,
2474–75 (2012). Mitigating information regarding many of the men has yet to be investigated or
developed because the mandatory nature of the life without parole sentence imposed upon them
rendered such factual development irrelevant to their sentencing decisions.
123. Paige Dickerson, Lifers Lead Classes to Prepare Other Prisoners for Success Beyond Cell
Walls, PENINSULA DAILY NEWS (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www.peninsuladailynews.com/article/
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parole for the double murder of an elderly couple in their home that he
and another boy committed in 1988. 124 While serving his sentence, Mr.
Rice has supported other Native American prisoners and their families
from behind bars and organized cultural events that honor and celebrate
Native American culture and community. 125
While these men committed terrible crimes as children, they have
demonstrated the development and redemption that can occur while
behind bars as teenagers age into grown men. Their lives illustrate real
world examples of why the Roper, Graham, and Miller Courts
compelled states to treat youth differently than adults when considering
extreme criminal sentences. A court or parole board should consider
how detrimental environmental factors, typical immaturity of youth, and
characteristics particular to the individual child combined to lead these
now men to prison and whether they have used the time there wisely.
The example of Ansel Hofstetter proves that resentencings may result
in significantly different sentences than those originally imposed. Ansel
Hofstetter was originally sentenced to life without parole for a murder he
committed as a sixteen-year-old. 126 He was recently resentenced after he
directly petitioned the original sentencing court for a new sentence
following Miller. 127 The Pierce County Superior Court vacated his 1992
life without parole sentence and imposed a determinate forty-year
sentence in its place. 128 While he is still subject to an extremely long
sentence, Ansel Hofstetter’s case demonstrates how resentencings may
result in many of these men receiving different sentences from the ones
originally imposed. However, his new forty-year mandatory determinate
sentence also illustrates another related issue: whether and to what extent
the principles announced in Roper, Graham, and Miller apply anytime a

20100907/news/309079993/lifers-lead-classes-to-prepare-other-prisoners-for-success-beyond; Nina
Shapiro, Gov. Gregoire: One Tough Clemency Judge, SEATTLE WEEKLY (July 3, 2007),
http://www.seattleweekly.com/2007-07-04/news/gov-gregoire-one-tough-clemency-judge.
124. See State v. Rice, 120 Wash. 2d 549, 554, 844 P.2d 416, 418 (1993).
125. Sara Jean Green, Children Bring Joy to Prison Powwows, SEATTLE TIMES, May 28, 2012, at
A1.
126. State v. Hofstetter, 75 Wash. App. 390, 391 n.1, 878 P.2d 474, 475 n.1 (1994).
127. Ansel Hofstetter’s case is unique in that he sought relief directly from the trial court. Most of
the other thirty men filed personal restraint petitions directly with the Washington State Supreme
Court, which has not yet ruled on any of those petitions. See, e.g., In re McNeil, No. 87654-1
(Wash. Sup. Ct. filed July 23, 2012). The trial court resentenced him after Miller without waiting for
direction from the Washington State Supreme Court.
128. Rob Carson, Orting Clerk Killer’s Life Sentence Reduced to 40 Years, THE NEWS TRIBUNE
(Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.thenewstribune.com/2013/10/18/2844694/orting-clerk-killers-lifesentence.html.
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court imposes a long determinate sentence upon a child. 129
IV. THE PRINCIPLES FROM THE MILLER/GRAHAM LINE OF
CASES APPLY TO OTHER LONG SENTENCES IMPOSED
UPON CHILDREN
There are many people in Washington’s prisons serving long
determinate sentences that functionally amount to life without parole.
Though in theory a term of years will end, in many cases, because of the
extreme length of the imposed term, the condemned will not survive to
see his release date. In function, these long, determinate “life equivalent”
or “de facto life” sentences are life in prison without the possibility of
parole; both extreme sentences ensure that the defendant will die in
prison. Furthermore, even if a child can actuarially expect to survive a
long prison sentence, decades-long mandatory determinate sentences
may be grossly disproportionate when applied to that particular child.
Accordingly, principles from Graham and Miller should equally apply to
long determinate sentences.130
Graham and Miller announced two new rules related to the criminal
sentencing of children. Miller commanded that before sentencing any
child to life without parole, a court must provide the child with an
individualized sentencing hearing. 131 Graham required that any child
convicted of a non-homicide receive a “realistic opportunity to obtain
release” at some point in the future. 132 The Supreme Court’s message in
Graham and Miller is clear: individualized sentencing and parole
eligibility should be essential features of sentencing structures involving
children where long sentences are contemplated.
In most cases, Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act (SRA)

129. Mr. Hofstetter was sentenced to a forty-year term under Washington’s Sentencing Reform
Act (SRA), WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.010 et seq. (2012), which requires that a judge impose a
sentence within a sentencing range determined by the nature of the conviction, the existence of
other sentence enhancements, and the defendant’s criminal record. See id. § 9.94A.530 (standard
sentence range); id. § 9.94A.533 (adjustments to standard sentences). Because of the mechanistic
manner in which criminal sentences are imposed under the SRA, Hofstetter’s recent SRA
sentencing did not include the type of thorough individualized examination of all mitigating factors
that Miller and now Washington law require.
130. See State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 121 (Iowa 2013) (“Graham requires a ‘meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ during the
offender’s expected lifetime, and Miller requires an individualized consideration of youth as a
mitigating factor at a sentencing hearing if such a realistic, meaningful opportunity will not be
available.” (citations omitted)).
131. Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469–75 (2012).
132. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
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determines the range of a permissible criminal sentence, based upon the
nature and seriousness of the crime and the defendant’s offender
score. 133 Sentences for certain crimes must be served consecutively and
mandatory sentence “enhancements” can add many additional years.134
In limited, exceptional circumstances, a court may impose a sentence
below the standard range. 135 However, “age is not alone a substantial
and compelling reason to impose an exceptional sentence.” 136 And
courts may not rely on many of the Miller factors to grant an exceptional
downward departure from the standard sentencing range. 137 In fact,
“[t]he SRA does not require courts to be more lenient to juveniles or
even encourage it.” 138 The interplay of these various sentencing laws
can, in certain circumstances, require the imposition of determinate term
sentences of fifty years or longer. 139 Such long mandatory determinate
sentences or “life-equivalent” sentences, while not technically life
without parole, carry with them similar constitutional deficiencies.140

133. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.505. The defendant’s prior criminal record determines the
offender score. Id. § 9.94A.525. As detailed below, special rules apply to sentencing for aggravated
first degree murder. See id. § 10.95.030.
134. Id. § 9.94A.589(b) (sentences for serious violent crimes must be served consecutively); id.
§ 9.94A.533(e) (firearms enhancements must be served consecutively to sentence for underlying
offense).
135. Id. § 9.94A.535; cf. In re Mulholland, 161 Wash. 2d 322, 331, 166 P.3d 677, 682 (2007)
(holding that trial courts with discretion to run sentences for multiple counts of first degree assault
concurrently in exceptional circumstances).
136. State v. Ha’mim, 132 Wash. 2d 834, 847, 940 P.2d 633, 639 (1997); see also State v. Scott,
72 Wash. App. 207, 218–19, 866 P.2d 1258, 1264 (1993), aff’d sub nom. State v. Ritchie, 126
Wash. 2d 388, 894 P.2d 1308 (1995) (“Scott asserts that his youth, 17 years old at the time of the
crime, limited his ‘capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law,’ and thus, the exceptional sentence [above the standard range] was
improper. This argument borders on the absurd.” (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.390(1)(e))).
137. See, e.g., Ha’mim, 132 Wash. 2d at 847, 940 P.2d at 639 (age); State v. Freitag, 127 Wash.
2d 141, 144, 896 P.2d 1254, 1256 (1995) (desire to improve self through community service); State
v. Hodges, 70 Wash. App. 621, 624, 855 P.2d 291, 293 (1993) (selling drugs to put food on the
table); State v. Sanchez, 69 Wash. App. 255, 260, 848 P.2d 208, 211 (1993) (limited education);
State v. Allert, 58 Wash. App. 200, 205, 791 P.2d 932, 935 (1990), rev’d, 117 Wash. 2d 156, 815
P.2d 752 (1991) (depression and alcoholism); State v. Estrella, 115 Wash. 2d 350, 359–60, 798 P.2d
289, 293 (1990) (willingness to rehabilitate); State v. Pennington, 112 Wash. 2d 606, 611, 772 P.2d
1009, 1012 (1989) (drug or alcohol problem); State v. Rogers, 112 Wash. 2d 180, 185, 770 P.2d
180, 182 (1989) (emotional and psychological stress); State v. Pascal, 108 Wash. 2d 125, 137, 736
P.2d 1065, 1072 (1987) (lack of danger to community and no criminal record).
138. State v. Ramos, 174 Wash. App. 1042, No. 30279–2–III, at *13 (Apr. 16, 2013)
(unpublished).
139. See, e.g., State v. Solis-Diaz, 152 Wash. App. 1038, 2009 WL 3261249, at *3 (Oct. 13,
2009) (unpublished) (sixteen-year-old defendant sentenced to 1111 months in prison following
conviction on six counts of first degree assault with mandatory firearm enhancements).
140. See Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1191 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding a 254-year sentence
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These life-equivalent cases and the life-without-parole cases share
defining characteristics. Each involves a crime committed by a child.
Many of these children are undoubtedly impacted by the psychosocial,
neurological, and environmental factors that led Kuntrell Jackson and
Evan Miller to commit murder. Furthermore, each faces a long
determinate sentence that the child will not outlive; functionally life
without parole. 141 The unpleasant realities of prison life reduce the life
expectancies of many prisoners incarcerated as children. 142 And so, even
determinate term sentences of no more than a few decades may actually
“indistinguishable” from life without parole); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 121–22 (Iowa
2013) (holding a mandatory minimum sixty-year term before parole eligibility is “functional
equivalent of life without parole”); People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012) (finding a
110-year mandatory minimum term violates Graham); In re Grisby, 121 Wash. 2d 419, 424, 853
P.2d 901, 903 (1993) (finding that consecutive minimum sentences that require more than two
hundred years before first parole eligibility result in “functional equivalent” of life without parole
sentence).
141. A number of courts have recognized that, at some point, long determinate sentences become
life-without-parole sentences. Moore, 725 F.3d at 1191 (“Moore’s sentence of 254 years is
materially indistinguishable from a life sentence without parole because Moore will not be eligible
for parole within his lifetime.”); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 121–22 (mandatory minimum sixty-year
term is “functional equivalent of life without parole”); Caballero, 282 P.3d at 295; Grisby, 121
Wash. 2d at 424, 853 P.2d at 903. However, efforts to determine the length of a “life” term
prospectively have been criticized. See In re Diaz, 170 Wash. App. 1039, 2012 WL 5348865, at *7
n.6 (Sept. 8, 2012) (unpublished); Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012),
review granted, 107 So. 3d 405 (Fla. 2012) (“At what number of years would the Eighth
Amendment become implicated in the sentencing of a juvenile: twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, some
lesser or greater number? Would gain time be taken into account? Could the number vary from
offender to offender based on race, gender, socioeconomic class or other criteria? Does the number
of crimes matter? There is language in the Graham majority opinion that suggests that no matter the
number of offenses or victims or type of crime, a juvenile may not receive a sentence that will cause
him to spend his entire life incarcerated without a chance for rehabilitation, in which case it would
make no logical difference whether the sentence is ‘life’ or 107 years. Without any tools to work
with, however, we can only apply Graham as it is written. If the Supreme Court has more in mind, it
will have to say what that is.”).
142. A person suffers a two-year decline in life expectancy for every year locked away in prison.
Evelyn J. Patterson, The Dose–Response of Time Served in Prison on Mortality: New York State,
1989–2003, 103 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 523, 526 (2013). The high levels of violence and
communicable diseases, poor diets, and shoddy health care all contribute to a significant reduction
in life expectancy behind bars. See United States v. Taveras, 436 F. Supp. 2d 493, 500 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) (finding “persistent problems in United States penitentiaries of prisoner rape, gang violence,
the use of excessive force by officers, [and] contagious diseases” that lead to a lower life expectancy
in prisons in the United States), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. United States v. Pepin, 514
F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2008); JOHN J. GIBBONS & NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH, CONFRONTING
CONFINEMENT 11 (2006). Entering prison at a young age is particularly dangerous. Youth
incarcerated in adult prisons are five times more likely to be victims of sexual or physical assault
than are adults. GIBBONS & KATZENBACH, supra note 142, at 11; Deborah LaBelle, Michigan Life
Expectancy Data for Youth Serving Natural Life Sentences, http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/02/Michigan-Life-Expectancy-Data-Youth-Serving-Life.pdf (last visited Dec.
12, 2013).

12 - Straley_Ready for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete)

2014]

MILLER’S PROMISE

10/9/2014 9:24 PM

987

result in life in prison. Finally, even if a prisoner survives long enough to
see release after a long determinate sentence, parole may be effectively
meaningless because of the prisoner’s age and related disabilities and
limitations.
The Supreme Court in Graham viewed the concept of “life” as
broader than simply biological survival. It implicitly endorsed the notion
that release from prison should be available at a time at which a
defendant might actually “live” outside the prison walls for some
appreciable period. 143
Life in prison without the possibility of parole gives no chance
for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation
with society, no hope. Maturity can lead to that considered
reflection which is the foundation for remorse, renewal, and
rehabilitation. A young person who knows that he or she has no
chance to leave prison before life’s end has little incentive to
become a responsible individual. 144
Parole eligibility must therefore begin early enough that the prisoner can
expect to enjoy some significant quality of life upon release. Until very
recently, children like Guadelupe Solis-Diaz faced decades long
sentences, with no realistic opportunity for any future life outside prison
walls, and without any court considering any of the mitigating factors
identified in Miller.
Sixteen-year-old Guadelupe Solis-Diaz fired seven shots at a group of
people standing in front of a Centralia bar from a car driven by a twentyone-year-old accomplice on August 10, 2007. 145 He missed everyone.
Following his arrest, Solis-Diaz was charged with six counts of firstdegree assault, one count of drive-by shooting, and the unlawful
possession of a firearm. 146 The teenager rejected a prosecution plea offer
of 180 months and proceeded to trial. Tried as an adult, he was
convicted and sentenced to 1111 months—over ninety-two years—in

143. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69–70 (2010) (“The State does not execute the offender
sentenced to life without parole, but the sentence alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is
irrevocable. It deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration.”).
144. Id. at 79.
145. In re Diaz, 170 Wash. App. 1039, 2012 WL 5348865, at *1 (Sept. 18, 2012) (unpublished).
Solis-Diaz’s case also demonstrates how a defendant’s youth can cloud his judgment as discussed
above. Solis-Diaz rejected a plea offer of 180 months imprisonment. Even though video evidence
placed him with a gun in the car at the time of the shooting, eyewitnesses identified him as the
shooter, and his alleged alibi witnesses were all easily discredited, he nonetheless rejected the plea
offer and decided to proceed to trial. Id.; see also State v. Solis-Diaz, 152 Wash. App. 1038, 2009
WL 3261249 (Oct. 13, 2009) (unpublished).
146. In re Diaz, 170 Wash. App. 1039, at *1.
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prison. His attorney called no witnesses on his behalf at his sentencing
hearing. 147 Solis-Diaz was condemned to die in prison for a crime which
injured no one and without any court considering any mitigating factors.
His case exemplifies the harsh and disproportionate consequences that
can arise under a mandatory determinate sentencing scheme that does
not allow for individualized sentencing or a realistic opportunity for
parole.
Other men and women housed in Washington’s prisons share similar
fates. And while the particular circumstances that led these lifeequivalent inmates to prison have not received significant attention,
certain facts are known. Data provided by Washington State’s
Department of Corrections (DOC) indicates that as of November 2010
there were more than 220 people serving sentences of longer than twenty
years for crimes they committed as children. 148 More than twenty people
are serving determinate terms of between forty and fifty years, and an
additional twenty-three people are serving terms of more than fifty
years. 149 Forty percent of people serving more than twenty years are
people of color. 150 The DOC estimates that over fifteen percent of people
serving more than twenty years are serving long determinate sentences
for non-homicide related crimes committed as children. 151 While they
committed crimes in which no one died, they nonetheless received long,
mandatory determinate sentences. Fortunately, courts, legislatures, and
the public in general have begun to push back against the imposition of
such severe criminal sentences.

147. Id. Because of the nature of the charges against him and his age, Solis-Diaz was “autodeclined” without a hearing from juvenile court into adult court. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(E)(I) (2012). Solis-Diaz’s attorney failed to call a single witness at his
sentencing hearing or even argue that his age should be considered a mitigating factor in deciding
the appropriate sentence within the 927 to 1111 month range. In re Diaz, 170 Wash. App. 1039, at
*2. Upon collateral review, the Court of Appeals remanded Solis-Diaz’s case to the trial court for
resentencing because of ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing stage. Id. at *7.
148. In October 2009 and again in November 2010, advocates with Columbia Legal Services
(CLS) requested and received demographic data from DOC for all people incarcerated as children in
Washington’s prisons as of those dates. The authors and others have reviewed that data which is on
file with CLS. DOC JLWOP INFORMATION, supra note 88.
149. Id.
150. Id. The Washington State DOC recently released information about the people that it
believes are eligible for resentencings or parole reviews under the Senate Bill. CLS independently
reviewed extensive DOC records and has reached different conclusions regarding the precise
numbers of inmates the Senate Bill affects. CLS is working with DOC to clarify the discrepancy and
ensure that all eligible people receive resentencings or parole reviews.
151. DOC JLWOP INFORMATION, supra note 88.
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MILLER AND GRAHAM ILLUSTRATE A LARGER TREND
AWAY FROM SENTENCING YOUTH TO THE MOST
SEVERE CRIMINAL SENTENCES

Science reaffirms the fundamental differences between youth and
adults that the law and society have long recognized. Laws prohibit
children under eighteen from engaging in a number of otherwise legal
activities—from smoking and drinking to voting and serving on a jury.
Private industry also regulates the behavior of young people. Because
they tend to drive more recklessly and cause more accidents, most
automobile rental companies refuse to rent to anyone under the age of
twenty-one and require that anyone under the age of twenty-five pay an
additional “risky driver surcharge.” 152 These long-standing limitations
on the conduct of children are justified—largely because of their
diminished capacities, the likelihood that they will act in rash and
socially irresponsible ways, and because of their susceptibility to harsh
environmental influences. 153
Because of these inherent traits of childhood, such legally recognized
limitations do not violate a child’s rights. “States validly may limit the
freedom of children to choose for themselves in the making of
important, affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences.”154
This “separate analysis of juvenile constitutional rights [is] justified by

152. See, e.g., Terms and Conditions, AVIS, http://redirect.avis.com/corp_accounts/tandc.html
(last visited Aug. 22, 2014); Age Restrictions and Surcharges, BUDGET, http://www.budget.com/
budgetWeb/html/en/common/agePopUp.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2014); Rent a Car Under 25,
DOLLAR, http://www.dollar.com/car_rental_information/main/rent_a_car_under_25 (last visited Aug.
22, 2014).
153. By statute, people under the age of eighteen may not legally engage in any of the following
activities: serve in the military without parental consent, 10 U.S.C. § 505(a) (2012); marry without
parental permission, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.015(1) (2012); execute a will, id. § 26.28.015(2);
vote, id. § 26.28.015(3); enter into legally binding contracts, id. § 26.28.015(4); consent to all forms
of medical care without parental permission, id. § 26.28.015(5); serve on a jury, id. § 2.36.070
(2012); consent to sexual activity, id. § 9A.44.093 (2012) (sexual misconduct with a minor in the
first degree); purchase or view pornography, id. §§ 9.68.050–9.68.060 (2012); smoke, id.
§ 70.155.080 (2012); gamble, id. § 67.70.120; drink alcohol, id. § 66.44.270 (2012); purchase
tobacco, id. § 26.28.080; or pawn personal items, id. § 19.60.066 (2012).
154. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979); cf. State v. Sieyes, 168 Wash. 2d 276, 304, 222
P.3d 995, 1009 (2010) (“[T]he State may limit the constitutional rights of adolescents in
circumstances different from those applied to adults in some contexts.”). For example, states may
limit children’s First Amendment rights, Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636–43 (1968),
access to abortion services, Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992)
(holding that states may require parental consent for a minor to obtain an abortion), and procedural
protections in criminal matters, Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967) (holding that juvenile
court need not provide same procedural protections as adult criminal court), without violating the
Constitution.
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(1) the particular vulnerability of children; (2) their inability to make
decisions in an informed, mature manner; and (3) the importance of the
parental role in child rearing.” 155 Therefore, the legal landscape is
“replete with laws and judicial recognition that children cannot be
viewed simply as miniature adults.” 156
Society and the law treat youth differently than adults because youth
and adults act differently. The Miller decision reaffirms this timehonored principle. 157 However, during the period when most of the men
serving life without parole in Washington were sentenced, there was a
movement away from this belief.
In the 1980s and 1990s, criminal justice policy and practice was
influenced by the notion that the country was facing an epidemic of
“juvenile superpredators.” Princeton Professor John DiIulio, who coined
the term, warned of a growing storm of “radically impulsive, brutally
remorseless” teenagers who “murder, assault, rape, rob, burglarize, deal
deadly drugs, join gun-toting gangs, and create serious communal
disorders.” 158 Academics blamed this development on a culture of
“moral poverty” in which youth were “surrounded by deviant delinquent
and criminal adults in abusive, violence-ridden, fatherless, Godless and
jobless settings.” 159 These views were shared by many influential
academics and policy makers. 160
This focus on “predatory teenagers” had a racist overtone.
Throughout the 1990s, youth of color were “overrepresented as
perpetrators and underrepresented as victims in media crime stories.” 161
155. Sieyes, 168 Wash. 2d at 305 n.11, 222 P.3d at 1009 n.11 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
156. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2404 (2011) (quoting Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114–15 (1982)).
157. See generally Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
158. John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Coming of the Superpredators, WEEKLY STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995,
at 23 (“We’re talking about elementary school youngsters who pack guns instead of lunches. We’re
talking about kids who have absolutely no respect for human life and no sense of the future.”).
159. Knight-Ridder, Experts: Kids Not Mutating Rising Violence Rate Blamed on Firearms,
SPOKANE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, May 29, 1996, at 1.
160. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 507 (1995) (predicting thousands
more “young muggers, killers and thieves”); Peter Annin, ‘Superpredators’ Arrive: Should We
Cage this New Breed of Vicious Kids, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1996, at 57 (Cook County State
Attorney Jack O’Malley stated, “It’s ‘Lord of the Flies’ on a massive scale . . . . Those states that
fail to prepare for the superpredators will regret it.”); Violent Crimes Down For Fifth Straight Year,
SPOKANE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, Jun. 4, 1997, available at http://www.spokesman.com/stories/
1997/jun/04/violent-crimes-down-for-fifth-straight-year (Spokane Police Chief Terry Mangan
claimed that the five-year decrease in Washington’s juvenile crime rate would be “short-lived” and
that “we shouldn’t rest on our laurels.”).
161. Perry L. Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media, Bias, and Legal Decisionmaking, 69 MD. L.
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Academics played to the fear of children of color:
Think how many black children grow up where parents neglect
and abuse them, where other adults and teenagers harass and
harm them, where drug dealers exploit them. Not surprisingly, in
return for the favor, some of these children kill, rape, maim, and
steal without remorse. 162
Though crime rates had remained steady since the 1970s and fell to
historically low levels in the following years, 163 this discourse infected
the media’s coverage of youth and crime throughout the 1990s, 164 and
affected how children were tried and sentenced. Forty-nine states,
including Washington State, passed laws to allow for easier or automatic
transfer of juveniles to the adult criminal system between 1992 and
1999. 165 Supporters demanded that children convicted of serious crime
face adult sentences. 166 Juveniles transferred into the adult criminal court

REV. 849, 852 (2010).
162. John J. DiIulio, Jr., My Black Crime Problem, and Ours, CITY JOURNAL (1996), available at
http://www.city-journal.org/html/6_2_my_black.html.
163. In 1994, eighty-eight percent of Americans believed that crime was at an all-time high. In
fact, violent crime rates had remained relatively steady since the early 1970s and property crime
was significantly reduced from what it had been in earlier decades. Crime rates began dropping
precipitously in the early 1990s and have remained historically low since that time. Lydia Salad,
Most Americans Believe Crime in U.S. is Worsening, GALLUP WELLBEING (Oct. 31, 2011),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/150464/americans-believe-crime-worsening.aspx.
164. Between 1990 and 1995, the three major television networks increased the number of crime
stories aired during their nightly newscasts from an average of fewer than 560 stories per year to
over 2500; a 462 percent increase in just five years. See Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s
Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 397, 422–23 (2006). National magazines warned Americans about the supposed
“superpredators.” See, e.g., Annin, supra note 160; Margaret Carlson, Children Without Souls,
TIME, Dec. 2, 1996, at 70; Richard Lacayo, Now for the Bad News: A Teenage Time Bomb, TIME,
Jan. 15, 1996, at 52 (“So long as we fool ourselves in thinking that we’re winning the war against
crime, we may be blindsided by this bloodbath of teenage violence that is lurking in the future.”);
Tom Morganthau, The Lull Before the Storm?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 5, 1995, at 40; Kids Without a
Conscience?, PEOPLE, Jun. 23, 1997, at cover. Local media added its voice. “More and more
children in this state are killing and beating people. . . . Almost no community is immune.” Marsha
King, Youth Crime Is Rising Fast, and Everyone Is a Victim, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 17, 1993, at A1;
Laura Myers, The Rise of ‘The Young and the Ruthless’: Juvenile-Crime Report Finds America’s
Children More Violent, More Victimized, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 7, 1995, at A5 (predicting an
approaching tsunami of youth crime, because “[t]he children are poorer. There are more minorities.
And they have more guns.”).
165. See JESSICA SHORT ET AL., DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT IN THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (2005). In 1997, the Washington State Legislature passed House Bill 3900,
which permitted the automatic transfer of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds into the adult criminal
system for certain offenses. Engrossed 3d Substitute H.B. 3900, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997).
166. See Norm Maleng, Editorial, A Stronger Response to Youth Violence, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan.
7, 1994), available at http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19940107&slug=
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were on the whole sentenced to longer terms than adults with similar
convictions during the 1990s. 167 Eighty percent of the men sentenced to
juvenile life without parole in Washington were sentenced between 1987
and 1999. 168 While youth of color make up twenty-nine percent of the
children in Washington, fifty percent of the men serving life without
parole for crimes they committed as children are people of color.169
The juvenile “superpredators” never arrived. After a brief, small
increase in juvenile crime, violent crime rates among young people have
plummeted since 1993 to all-time lows despite an increase in the overall
juvenile population. 170 These demographic realities have led even
Professor DiIulio and other former proponents of this discredited theory
to acknowledge they were wrong. 171
As the public concern died away, sentencing behaviors changed. No
1888390; cf. Kery Murakami, Legislators, Locke Agree on Juvenile-Justice Bill, SEATTLE TIMES,
Apr. 26, 1997, at C5.
167. Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in THE CHANGING BORDERS
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 234–36 (Jeffrey
Fagan & Franklin E. Zimmering eds., 2000). During most of the period between 1985 and 2001,
youth convicted of murder in the United States were more likely to be sentenced to life without
parole sentences than adult murder offenders. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT’L, THE
REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 2
(2005); cf. State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 53, 71 (Iowa 2013) (discussing superpredator theory and
its impact on sentencing of youth, while holding that Miller requires individualized sentencing of
youth sentenced to mandatory minimum 52.5 year term).
168. See infra Appendix A.
169. COALITION REPORT, supra note 89, at 16 (“As with declination and other sentencing, the
sentencing of youth to life in prison without the possibility of parole in Washington is racially
disproportionate. Of the twenty-eight youth serving life in prison without the possibility of parole,
fourteen are white, three are African American, four are Asian, three are Hispanic, three are Native
American, and one is African American/Native American. Youth of color make up just over 29
percent of Washington’s youth population, but 50 percent of youth sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole.”).
170. See CHARLES PUZZANCHERA & BENJAMIN ADAMS, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 121052, JUVENILE ARRESTS 2009, at 8
(Dec. 2011). Criminologists attribute this brief uptick in youthful violent crime in the early 1990s to
the introduction of crack cocaine onto American streets, a corresponding surge in gang-related
violence, and easy access to firearms. David M. Kennedy et al., Youth Violence in Boston: Gun
Markets, Serious Youth Offenders, and a Use-Reduction Strategy, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147,
152 (1996).
171. See Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young “Superpredators,” Bush Aide Has Regrets,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at A19 (quoting DiIulio, “[i]f I knew then what I know now, I would
have shouted for prevention of crimes”); James Alan Fox, A Too-Harsh Law on Juvenile Murder,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 25, 2007, at A11 (“[i]t’s time to rethink our rigid juvenile murder law”). Both
Professors DiIulio and James Fox signed onto an amici brief in support of the petitioners in the
Miller case. See Brief of Jeffrey Fagan et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Miller v.
Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 10-9647); cf. Null, 836 N.W.2d at 53 (discussing
Professors DiIulio and Fox and the discredited superpredator theory).
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Washington child has been sentenced to life without parole since 2004
and only four received such sentences from 2000 to 2004. 172 In recent
surveys, members of the public have supported criminal justice policies
that treat children as children, even those children who have committed
terrible crimes. 173 These changing societal notions and the Supreme
Court decisions set the framework for the Washington State
Legislature’s examination of extreme juvenile sentencing during the
2014 legislative session.
VI. WASHINGTON’S RESPONSE TO MILLER AND GRAHAM
The 2014 legislative session saw a significant rewrite of the
sentencing structure applied to children who commit serious crimes.
Second Substitute Senate Bill 5064 (hereinafter “the Act” or “the Senate
Bill”) 174 that passed out of the legislature and which Governor Inslee
signed on March 28, 2014, addresses two types of extreme sentences for
172. See infra Appendix A. Children continue to commit terrible murders, but are not receiving
life without parole sentences. See, e.g., Jonathan Martin, Youth Confesses to Role in Murder; 14Year Sentence Surprises Courtroom, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 29, 2005, at A1 (two boys who were
twelve at time of crime sentenced to twenty-six years and fourteen years respectively for murder of
thirteen-year-old playmate); Josh Farley, South Kitsap Teen Guilty of Murdering 87-Year-Old
Neighbor, KITSAP SUN, Dec. 14, 2010, available at http://www.kitsapsun.com/news/2010/dec/14/
mustard-found-guilty-in-murder-of-87-year-old/ (seventeen-year-old receives fifty-year sentence for
robbing and killing eighty-seven-year-old victim); Josh Tucker Pleads Guilty in West Richland
Murder Case, KNDO (Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.kndu.com/global/story.asp?s=8019620; M.L.
Lyke, Heather Opel, 14, Is Sentenced to 22 Years for Role in Murder, SEATTLE P-I (Aug. 16, 2002),
http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Heather-Opel-14-is-sentenced-to-22-years-for-1093792.php
(fourteen-year-old girl sentenced to twenty-two years for participation in pre-meditated murder of a
sixty-four-year-old victim); Josh Peterson, Donald Schalchlin Sentenced to Nearly 11 Years in
Prison, KAPP TV (July 22, 2009), http://www.kapptv.com/article/2009/jul/22/donald-schalchlinsentenced-to-nearly-11-years-in-/ (sixteen-year-old and fifteen-year-old adolescents sentenced to
forty years and eleven years respectively for murder of thirteen-year-old girl and her mother);
Tacoma Brothers Plead Guilty to Killing Fellow Teenager Last Year, Get Prison Terms, TACOMA
NEWS TRIBUNE, May 20, 2013, available at http://blog.thenewstribune.com/crime/2013/05/20/
tacoma-brothers-plead-guilty-to-killing-fellow-teenager-last-year-get-prison-terms/ (sixteen- and
fourteen-year-old brothers sentenced to twenty-six years and twenty-four years for murder of
fifteen-year-old boy).
173. COALITION REPORT, supra note 89, at 19; see also NAT’L JUVENILE JUSTICE NETWORK,
POLLING ON PUBLIC ATTITUDES ABOUT THE TREATMENT OF YOUNG OFFENDERS 1 (2010)
(discussing a number of polls on the public’s feelings regarding juvenile justice issues). In a 2012
poll, Washington residents indicated that eighty-two percent of respondents believed that all
youthful murders should be eligible for parole after serving twenty-five years, while ninety-four
percent believed parole eligibility is appropriate after serving thirty years. Jennifer L. Devenport, W.
Wash. Univ., Life Without Parole for Juvenile Offenders: A Survey of Washington State Residents
(2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Western Washington University Department of
Psychology).
174. 2d Substitute S.B. 5064, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2014).
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children: sentences for aggravated first degree murder and determinate
sentences of more than twenty years. The Act grants individualized
sentencing hearings in some cases and automatic parole eligibility in
others.
Life without the possibility of parole was the only available sentence
for a child convicted of aggravated first degree murder before passage of
the Senate Bill. 175 Courts were barred from reducing a life without
parole sentence due to any mitigating factor. 176 The lack of sentencing
discretion rendered Washington’s aggravated first degree murder statute
unconstitutional as applied to children following Miller. The Senate Bill
was the legislature’s effort to respond to the constitutional deficiencies
of Washington’s aggravated murder statute.
The Act provides for different aggravated murder sentences based
upon the age of the child at the time of the crime. 177 Children under the
age of sixteen at the time of the murder must be sentenced to an
indeterminate twenty-five-to-life term. 178 Such children will become
parole eligible after serving twenty-five years. However, release is not
guaranteed. 179 A court may not set a lower minimum term based upon
individual characteristics of the child or other mitigating factors.180
175. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (2012). Former Revised Code of Washington (RCW) section
10.95.030 (2012) provided for only two possible sentences following a conviction for aggravated
first-degree murder: death or life in prison without the possibility of parole. See id. (“(1) Except as
provided in subsection (2) of this section, any person convicted of the crime of aggravated first
degree murder shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of release or
parole . . . (2) If, pursuant to a special sentencing proceeding held under RCW 10.95.050, the trier of
fact finds that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency, the sentence shall
be death.”). The Washington State Supreme Court prohibited the imposition of the death penalty
against children in 1993. State v. Furman, 122 Wash. 2d 440, 458, 858 P.2d 1092, 1102–03 (1993)
(Furman predated the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005), where the Court ruled unconstitutional the application of the death penalty to children of
any age.). Therefore, prior to passage of the Senate Bill, life without parole was a mandatory
sentence for any child convicted of aggravated first degree murder.
176. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(1) & (2).
177. Compare Act of Mar. 31, 2014, ch. 130, sec. 9(3)(a)(i), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws 659,
667 (codified at WASH REV. CODE § 10.95.030(3)(a)(i)) (requiring sentence of minimum twentyfive year term and maximum of life for children fifteen and younger), with id. ch. 130, sec.
9(3)(a)(ii), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 667–68 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.95.030(3)(a)(ii)) (allowing sentence of minimum of “no less than twenty-five years” and
maximum term of life for any child who is sixteen or seventeen at time of crime and explicitly
providing that “[a] minimum term of life may be imposed, in which case the person will be
ineligible for parole or early release”).
178. Id. sec. 9(3)(a)(i), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 667 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.95.030(3)(a)(i)).
179. See id.; id. sec. 9(3)(f), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.95.030(3)(f)).
180. Compare id. sec. 9(3)(a)(i), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 667 (codified at WASH. REV.
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Sixteen- or seventeen-year-olds convicted of aggravated first degree
murder will be sentenced differently. The Senate Bill requires an
individualized sentencing hearing at which the court must consider the
factors set out in Miller before sentencing an older child. 181 Following
such a hearing, the court must impose a maximum term of life, but has
the discretion to set a minimum sentence of anywhere between twentyfive years and life. 182 Therefore, even after the recent statutory change, a
court may sentence a sixteen or seventeen-year-old defendant to life
without parole, but is no longer required to do so. 183
In addition to providing parole eligibility to some children convicted
of aggravated first degree murder, the Act also guarantees parole review
to another category of people: those serving long determinate sentences
for crimes committed as children.184 Any person sentenced to a
determinate sentence of more than twenty years as a child may seek
parole after serving twenty years of “total confinement.” 185 However, the
Act does not allow a court to hold a Miller individualized hearing during
this determinate sentencing. 186
CODE § 10.95.030(3)(a)(i)) (mandating indeterminate twenty-five to life term), with id. sec. 9(3)(b),
§ 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(3)(b)) (requiring
court to consider Miller factors when setting minimum term for sixteen and seventeen-year-olds).
181. Id. sec. 9(3)(b), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.95.030(3)(b)). The Act explicitly requires courts to “take into account mitigating factors that
account for the diminished culpability of youth as provided in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455
(2012), including, but not limited to, the age of the individual, the youth’s childhood and life
experience, the degree of responsibility the youth was capable of exercising, and the youth’s
chances of becoming rehabilitated.” Id. This is a slightly different formulation than the Court’s
actual language in Miller, which requires at a minimum that a sentencing court examine the
defendant’s “chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity,
and failure to appreciate risks and consequences,” his “family and home environment,” “the
circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and
the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him,” and the prospects for rehabilitation
while incarcerated. Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012).
182. Act of Mar. 31, 2014, ch. 130, sec. 9(3)(a)(ii), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 667–68.
183. Id.
184. Id. at § 10, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 669 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.641). As
discussed above, the Act grants younger children convicted of aggravated first degree murder
automatic parole eligibility after serving twenty-five years. Sentencing courts will determine the
parole eligibility dates for older children after individualized sentencing hearings.
185. Id. at § 10(1), 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 669. Youth convicted of aggravated first degree
murder and any person convicted of a crime committed after his eighteenth birthday are not eligible
for early release under this section. Id. § 10(1).
186. Compare id. sec. 9(3)(b), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668 (providing for sentencing
hearing at which Miller factors evaluated for sixteen- or seventeen-year-old convicted of aggravated
murder), with id. § 10, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 669 (granting parole eligibility to “any person
convicted of one or more crimes committed prior to the person’s eighteenth birthday,” but not
granting individualized sentencing).
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The Act refers all parole decisions to Washington’s Indeterminate
Sentencing Review Board (ISRB). The ISRB reviews all relevant
information and holds a hearing. Only limited due process protections
apply in ISRB hearings. 187 The ISRB must order the person released
unless it determines that it is likely that the person will commit a new
crime after release. 188 This standard for release is substantially similar to
that included in RCW 9.95.420, which prescribes when the ISRB must
order offenders convicted of certain sex offenses paroled from prison.189
If the board denies release after the parole review, it must again consider
the person for parole at least every five years thereafter. 190 If the parole

187. See, e.g., In re McCarthy, 161 Wash. 2d 234, 245, 164 P.3d 1283, 1288 (2007) (though due
process does require “minimum procedural protections,” an inmate serving an indeterminate term
for a sex offense has no right to counsel during ISRB hearing on petition for early release); WASH.
ADMIN. CODE §§ 381-90-080 to 381-90-170 (2014) (ISRB procedures that govern parole hearings
for people convicted of certain sex offenses).
188. Act of Mar. 31, 2014, ch. 130, sec. 9(3)(f), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668; id. § 10(3),
2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 669 (the ISRB “shall order the person released . . . unless the board
determines by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . it is more likely than not that the person will
commit new criminal law violations if released”). The Act obligates DOC to assess all people
eligible for parole five years before the expiration of their minimum terms. As part of this
assessment, DOC must identify appropriate programing and services to prepare the particular person
for release. Id. sec. 9(3)(d), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668; id. § 10 (2), 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws
at 669. Then, shortly before the expiration of the minimum term, DOC must again evaluate the
person to gauge the likelihood the person will commit new crimes upon release. Id. sec. 9(3)(f), § 3,
2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668; id. § 10(3), 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 669 (“No later than one
hundred eighty days from receipt of the petition for early release, [DOC] shall conduct, and the
offender shall participate in, an examination of the person, incorporating methodologies that are
recognized by experts in the prediction of dangerousness, and including a prediction of the
probability that the person will engage in future criminal behavior.”). DOC then passes this
evaluation and other information on to the ISRB which conducts the parole eligibility review. Id.
sec. 9(3)(f), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668; id. § 10(1), 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 669.
189. Cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.420(3)(a) (2012) (“The board shall order the offender released,
under such affirmative and other conditions as the board determines appropriate, unless the board
determines by a preponderance of the evidence that, despite such conditions, it is more likely than
not that the offender will commit sex offenses if released.”). The ISRB utilizes a series of factors in
making a determination whether a sex offender is likely to reoffend. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 38190-150. They include: (1) any refusal to participate in available programming designed to reduce
risk of re-offense; (2) serious and repeated disciplinary infractions while in prison; (3) evidence of
an inmate’s continuing intent or propensity to engage in sex offenses; (4) whether the inmate has
expressed unwillingness to comply with any conditions of community custody; and (5) the
assessment of the likelihood of future risk of re-offense. Id. Similar considerations will likely direct
the ISRB’s decision making process when addressing people to whom the Act grants parole
eligibility. According to ISRB data, over forty percent of ISRB hearings resulted in a finding that
the offender should be released from prison in FY 2011. See WASH. STATE DEP’T OF CORR.,
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE REVIEW BOARD AT A GLANCE (2011), available at
http://www.doc.wa.gov/isrb/docs/at_a_glance.pdf.
190. Act of Mar. 31, 2014, ch. 130, sec. 9(3)(f), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668; id. § 10(1),
2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 669.
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board orders the person released, the ISRB will also set the length of
community supervision to which the individual will be subject once on
the outside.
The Act will have an immediate impact on the sentences of a number
of people currently serving life without parole or long determinate
sentences for crimes committed as children. The legislature explicitly
applied the Act’s provisions retroactively to the men currently serving
life without parole for murders committed as children and to anyone else
currently serving determinate sentences of more than twenty years. 191
The twenty-nine men serving life without parole will all be resentenced
in the near future. Those who were sixteen or seventeen at the time of
their crimes will receive individualized sentencing hearings. The men
who were younger will be sentenced to indeterminate twenty-five to life
terms. Some of them will be immediately parole eligible, as will a
number of people serving determinate sentences of more than twenty
years. 192
VII. MORE REMAINS TO BE DONE
The Senate Bill significantly alters the sentencing of children
convicted of many serious crimes. While clear in certain respects, the
new law leaves ample room for interpretation by courts in a number of
areas. The nature of the individualized sentencing hearings required for
older teenagers convicted of aggravated murder is one such area
confronting Washington courts. The Senate Bill requires consideration
of the Miller factors at sentencing, but does not provide other guidance
to courts regarding these hearings. 193 Courts should take direction from
precedent governing death penalty sentencing in fashioning rules and
procedures for these hearings.
In addition, the Senate Bill does not go far enough to treat children as
children during criminal sentencing. It allows courts to continue to
sentence children to life without parole and it does not require
individualized sentencing hearings in all cases in which such hearings
are warranted. The science, societal shifts away from extreme sentences
for children, and the spirit of recent Supreme Court opinions support
both the complete elimination of life without parole sentences for
children and the use of individualized sentencing hearings any time a
191. Id. § 11, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 670.
192. Id. sec. 9(3)(f), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668; id. § 10(3), 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at
669.
193. Id. sec. 9(3)(b), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668.
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child faces many years in prison.
A.

Similar Procedures and Rules Should Apply to the Hearings
Required by the Senate Bill Because the Miller Hearings Are
Substantially Similar to the Penalty Phase Hearings in Capital
Murder Trials

The Senate Bill was the legislature’s response to the Supreme Court’s
recent juvenile sentencing cases. Miller and Graham should therefore
guide the new individualized sentencing hearings that the Senate Bill
creates.
The Court first in Graham and again in Miller recognized that a life
without parole sentence for a child is tantamount to a sentence of
death. 194 In reaching this conclusion, the Court asserted that life without
parole sentences “share some characteristics with death sentences that
are shared by no other sentences.” 195 They both “alter[] the offender’s
life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable.” 196 The severity of a life without
parole sentence is particularly acute for a child because “he will
inevitably serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison
than an older offender. The penalty when imposed on a teenager, as
compared with an older person, is therefore the same . . . in name
only.” 197
Justice Kagan, writing for the Miller Court, reasoned that because life
without parole sentences are “akin to the death penalty,” they demand “a
distinctive set of legal rules,” 198 including the need for “individualized
sentencing.” 199 Miller’s requirement of individual sentencing hearings
explicitly rests upon the Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence,
which requires the same type of hearings before putting a defendant to
death. 200 That death penalty case law should therefore guide Washington

194. Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466–67 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 70 (2010).
195. Graham, 560 U.S. at 70.
196. Id.
197. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 2467.
200. Id. at 2467 (“Graham’s treatment of juvenile life sentences as analogous to capital
punishment makes relevant here a second line of our precedents, demanding individualized
sentencing when imposing the death penalty.” (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 89 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) and citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding that the
imposition of mandatory death penalty is unconstitutional because it fails to allow for consideration
of character and record of individual defendant)).
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courts when deciding what is required as part of the new Act’s
individualized sentencings. 201
Courts must consider all relevant mitigating factors before sentencing
a child to die in prison to ensure the sentence is reserved for only the
most extreme circumstances. As Justice Kagan noted in Miller, the
Court’s “[death penalty] decisions have elaborated on the requirement
that capital defendants have an opportunity to advance, and the judge or
jury a chance to assess, any mitigating factors, so that the death penalty
is reserved only for the most culpable defendants committing the most
serious offenses.” 202 Similarly, a court considering a life sentence for a
child must “have the ability to consider the mitigating qualities of
youth.” 203 The breadth of the required inquiry is vast.
A sentencer must be allowed to consider “any relevant circumstance
that could cause it to decline to impose the [death] penalty” during the
penalty phase of a capital murder trial. 204 This mandate in death penalty
cases requires extensive and exhaustive pre-hearing preparation and
investigation. The Court has explicitly endorsed guidelines developed by
the American Bar Association as indicative of what the constitution

201. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467. The body of case law regarding death penalty phase hearings is
extensive. See, e.g., Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945 (2010) (holding that failure to develop and present
evidence of abusive home environment and deficits in mental cognition and reasoning was
constitutionally deficient representation); Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40 (2009) (noting that
even though defendant was “fatalistic and uncooperative” defense attorney must nonetheless
conduct reasonable mitigation investigation); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (holding
that defense attorney who had defendant evaluated by psychologist and gathered some documents
nonetheless provided inadequate assistance of counsel because he failed to gather all relevant
documents, seek additional expert testimony, or follow up on potentially mitigating evidence that
review of available records uncovered); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395–96 (2000) (holding
that defense attorney was constitutionally ineffective when he began penalty phase preparation
week before trial, failed to gather relevant records, develop or introduce evidence that defendant
was “borderline mentally retarded,” or other evidence that militated against imposition of death); cf.
In re Yates, 177 Wash. 2d 1, 42, 296 P.3d 872, 892 (2013) (holding counsel’s failure to interview
victims’ family members to determine whether any of them would testify that death penalty should
not be imposed constituted ineffective assistance of counsel).
202. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (citing Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 74–76 (1987); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110–12 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 597–609 (1978)).
203. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
204. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987); see also id. (“[T]he State cannot channel the
sentencer’s discretion, but must allow it to consider any relevant information offered by the
defendant.”); Smith v. Spisak, 558 U.S. 139, 144 (2010) (“First, the Constitution forbids imposition
of the death penalty if the sentencing judge or jury is precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Second, the sentencing judge or
jury may not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence.”
(emphasis removed, internal citations and quotations omitted)).
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requires as part of death penalty proceedings. 205 Those guidelines require
pre-hearing “efforts to discover all reasonable available mitigating
evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be
introduced by the prosecutor.” 206
An attorney representing an older child facing an aggravated murder
charge must investigate, develop, and present a great deal of evidence
regarding the child’s crime, family life, schooling, medical history and
social networks to sentencing courts. Mitigation experts will be
necessary to review this evidence, evaluate the defendant, and provide
opinions on a variety of relevant issues.
The financial resources required to carry out a constitutionally
sufficient pre-sentence investigation and individualized sentencing
hearing will be substantial. 207 In Washington, at a minimum, a county
must appoint two full-time, experienced death penalty attorneys, a
mitigation specialist, and an investigator to any defendant facing the
death penalty. 208 Counties must also provide the defense with sufficient
funds to retain relevant experts. 209 Similar efforts will be required before
a child facing a life without parole sentence can be sentenced.210
205. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524–25 (2003); cf. In re Yates, 177 Wash. 2d at 41, 296 P.3d at 892
(“Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association [ (ABA) ] standards and the
like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable.” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 688 (1984))).
206. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (emphasis added) (quoting ABA Guidelines for the Appointment
and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 11.4.1(C), 93 (1989)).
207. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.101.030 (2012) (requiring all Washington counties and cities to
adopt standards for delivery of public defense services, including standards on compensation of
counsel, experts, investigators, and other administrative support for defense).
208. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.010.030 requires that all Washington counties adopt standards for
public defense that track the Washington State Bar Association’s (WSBA) Standards for Indigent
Defense Services. The WSBA approved standards for indigent defense services on June 3, 2011.
WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES (2011). WSBA Standard
Fourteen delineates some of the resources that counties must make available to defendants in death
penalty cases. Id. at 10. They include, “at a minimum, [two death penalty qualified] attorneys, a
mitigation specialist and an investigator. Psychiatrists, psychologists and other experts and support
personnel should be added as needed.” Id.; see also id. at 4 (WSBA Standard Four provides that
“[r]easonable compensation for expert witnesses necessary to preparation and presentation of the
defense case shall be provided.”); id. at 5 (WSBA Standard Six delineates that “[p]ublic defense
attorneys shall use investigation services as appropriate. Public defender offices, assigned counsel,
and private law firms holding public defense contracts should employ investigators with
investigation training and experience.”); id. at 6 (WSBA Standard Seven provides that “[e]ach
agency or attorney should have access to mental health professionals to perform mental health
evaluations.”).
209. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.010.030.
210. The passage of time will significantly complicate the resentencings of some of the men
currently serving juvenile life without parole. The Senate Bill applies retroactively to all of the
thirty men currently serving life without parole for crimes committed as children. See Act of March
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Counties must make those resources available because the legislature did
not eliminate life without parole sentences for children. It should have.
B.

Life Without Parole Is an Unnecessary and Unjust Sentence When
Imposed upon a Child

The legislature did not go far enough during the 2014 session. It
allowed Washington courts to impose life without parole sentences upon
children in narrow circumstances. It should revisit this decision and
completely ban them in every case. Life without parole sentences should
never be imposed upon children.
The United States is the only country in the world that sentences
children to die in prison. 211 In fact, the International Convention on the
Rights of the Child explicitly forbids sentencing anyone under the age of
eighteen to life without parole.212 Because of the harsh consequences
such sentences impose upon children and the availability of other more
effective and just sentencing options, a growing number of states have
entirely outlawed such sentences in all cases involving children. 213 As
31, 2014, ch. 130, § 11, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws 659, 670 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE.
§ 10.95.0001). Nine of them were younger than sixteen years old at the times of their crimes. DOC
JLWOP INFORMATION, supra note 88. These nine men therefore face mandatory, indeterminate
twenty-five to life terms. Act of March 31, 2014, ch. 30, sec. 9(3)(a)(i), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws
at 667. The other twenty men will be returned to the original sentencing court for full individualized
resentencings. Id. sec. 9(3)(a)(ii), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 667–68. These resentencings
present many significant obstacles because of the length of time that has elapsed since the original
crimes. For example, John Lee Forrester was convicted in Spokane County of aggravated first
degree murder as a seventeen-year-old in 1977. See DOC JLWOP INFORMATION, supra note 88.
Constructing an accurate picture of Mr. Forrester’s childhood and life circumstances before coming
to prison will be daunting. Potential witnesses have undoubtedly passed away, reliable records have
disappeared, expert testimony regarding the person he used to be may be difficult to develop. The
passage of time will require significant resources and truly able counsel in order to properly present
mitigation evidence demanded by Miller.
211. CONNIE DE LA VEGA ET AL., CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A
GLOBAL CONTEXT 61 (2012) (“The United States remains the only country in the world to sentence
a juvenile to life without parole in practice. Eight countries have been identified as having laws that
could allow for a sentence of JLWOP; however there are no known cases of the sentence being
imposed. Additionally, four countries have ambiguous language regarding JLWOP; however, since
there are no known cases of juveniles being sentenced, it can be determined that the country does
not practice the sentence. As such, there is only one country in the world with a child serving an
LWOP sentence.” (citations omitted)).
212. U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, Art. 37, G.A. Res 44/25, Annex, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49, at 167 (1989), entered into force Sept. 2,
1990. The United States and Somalia are the only two countries in the world that have not adopted
the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81 (2010).
213. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401 (LexisNexis 2014) (notes reflect that the Supreme Court
held “that the eighth amendment prohibits a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of
parole for juvenile offenders” (citing Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)); D.C.
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detailed above, recent local sentencing practices appear to reflect this
international disfavor in sentencing children to life without parole. 214
While not categorically outlawing life without parole sentences for
children, the Supreme Court in Miller expressed significant disfavor of
such sentences. 215 International norms, societal pressures, and
developing jurisprudential principles all support eradicating life without
parole sentences for children in all cases.
Legitimate concerns for public safety do not require life without
parole terms. The neurological and psychosocial development that all
teenagers undergo means that no court can know with any certainty at
the time of sentencing whether a particular defendant will become
rehabilitated and redeemed over the course of many years behind bars. A
long minimum-term sentence with parole eligibility allows for an
extended period of incapacitation and potential rehabilitation, while also
ensuring that no determination is irrevocable. 216 The possibility of parole
also encourages defendants to pursue available rehabilitative services
and avoid destructive behaviors while incarcerated.217 Parole eligibility

CODE § 22-2104 (LexisNexis 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-656 (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-6618 (West 2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 640.040 (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
265, § 2 (West 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-105.02 (West 2014) (providing that the
maximum penalty for a person who committed a Class 1A felony under the age of eighteen is life
imprisonment); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-10 (West 2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (West
2013–2014) (prohibiting the death penalty if the offense was committed when the perpetrator was
under eighteen years old); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (West 2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2101 (West 2014); H.B. 4210, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2014).
214. See discussion supra notes 35–36.
215. Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (“[G]iven all we have said in
Roper, Graham, and this decision about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity
for change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty
will be uncommon. That is especially so because of the great difficulty . . . of distinguishing at this
early age between ‘the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity,
and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’ Although we do not
foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into
account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” (internal citations omitted)).
216. As the Court in Graham recognized, the possibility that a sentence may be commuted by the
Governor at some future point does not provide a realistic opportunity for release. Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010); see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 301 (1983)
(“Commutation . . . is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency. A Governor may commute a
sentence at any time for any reason without reference to any standards.”). Parole eligibility is the
means to ensure that legitimate public safety concerns and the individual characteristics of the
inmate are appropriately balanced and release granted when warranted.
217. Graham, 560 U.S. at 73; see also Simon Fraser University, Prison Rehab Tied to Parole
Decisions, SCIENCE DAILY (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/09/
120925143914.htm (stating that recent research indicates that parole board decisions impact
whether and to what extent prisoners seek out opportunities for rehabilitation) (citing and quoting D.
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allows a future parole board to evaluate the circumstances of each
individual case in order to determine whether release is appropriate at
that point. Life without parole does not present such an opportunity.
Well-known racial disparities endemic to the criminal justice system
in Washington also counsel against imposition of irrevocable life
without parole terms. Children of color make up a disproportionate
number of the juveniles caught up in Washington’s criminal justice
system, 218 and are also overrepresented among the people serving
extreme sentences for crimes committed as children. 219 Absent some
realistic opportunity for parole and recognition at the sentencing stage of
the role that race, poverty, and their attendant consequences played upon
the actions of the child before the bench, those disparate impacts will be
forever solidified among the people serving the longest sentences.
Locking children of color behind bars for the rest of their lives with no
possibility of release needlessly perpetuates a racially biased sentencing
system.
As many other nations, states and courts have recognized, life without
parole sentences for children are unjust and unnecessary. While the
Senate Bill makes important first steps in treating children as children,
the Washington Legislature should go a step further and prohibit life
without parole sentences for children in all cases.
C.

A Court Should Hold an Individualized Sentencing Hearing
Anytime It Imposes an Exceptionally Long Sentence upon a Child

The Washington legislature should also require a court to consider the
individual characteristics of youth whenever it is deciding whether to
sentence a child to many years behind bars. Absent a change to existing
law, courts will continue to impose life with parole and “life equivalent”
sentences without ever considering the individual circumstances of the
children before them. Individualized sentencing should occur even in
circumstances where parole is possible.
Bernhardt et al., Rehabilitated or Not: An Informational Theory of Parole Decisions, 28 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 186 (2010)).
218. See generally WASH. STATE TASK FORCE ON RACE AND THE CRIMINAL JUST. SYS, JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY: A PRESENTATION TO THE WASHINGTON STATE
SUPREME COURT 1 (Mar. 28, 2012) (finding that “youth of color continue to be disproportionately
arrested, referred to juvenile court, prosecuted, detained and sentenced to secure confinement
compared to their white peers” and that “[t]here is clear evidence of persistent over-representation
of youth of color at every stage of the juvenile justice system”).
219. See COALITION REPORT, supra note 89, at 16 (people of color make up fifty percent of men
serving life without parole for crimes committed as children while only twenty-nine percent of
Washington’s population are people of color).
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Even after the Act’s passage, in many cases, courts are required to
sentence children to long mandatory sentences. By operation of
Washington’s automatic decline statute, teenagers charged with a variety
of different crimes are automatically transferred to the adult system for
prosecution. 220 Upon conviction in the adult system, sentencing
enhancements, mandatory minimum terms, and mandatory consecutive
sentencing laws mandate long determinate sentences without regard for
the individual circumstances of the children before them.
While the Act provides parole eligibility to some children, a
mandatory two decades behind bars may in many cases be an unjust
sentence once all relevant factors are appropriately considered and
weighed. Furthermore, in no case is parole guaranteed. A child
sentenced to life with the possibility of parole may nonetheless actually
serve life in prison. In each instance, a court makes a determination at
sentencing whether a life sentence is appropriate based upon the
individual circumstances of the case and defendant before them.
Washington courts have recognized that in some cases long prison
sentences are constitutionally indistinct from life without parole
sentences. 221 In Matter of Grisby, 222 the Washington State Supreme
Court addressed the appeal of a defendant sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole for the murders of five people. The Grisby Court
ruled that such a sentence “while obviously not identical, [is]
substantially similar” to the only alternative sentence for which he was
eligible: five consecutive life sentences with the possibility of parole
sentences, with initial parole eligibility only after serving two hundred
years. 223 Given that the defendant would never live to see parole, the
Court ruled that the two sentences were identical for constitutional

220. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.030(1)(e)(v) (2012) (sixteen- or seventeen-year-old defendants
who are charged with variety of violent offenses must be tried in adult court).
221. See State v. Rivers, 129 Wash. 2d 697, 714, 921 P.2d 495, 503 (1996) (“[D]istinction
between life sentences with and without parole is not significant.”); In re Personal Restraint of
Grisby, 121 Wash. 2d 419, 425–31, 853 P.2d 901, 903–08 (1993) (life with parole eligibility after
hundreds of years substantially similar to life without parole); State v. Frampton, 95 Wash. 2d 469,
528–30, 627 P.2d 922, 952–53 (1981) (Dimmick, J., concurring in part) (because life with parole
and life without parole are substantially similar sentences, a statute does not treat a defendant who
pleads guilty and receives life with parole differently from a defendant who elects to go to trial and
receives life without parole). But see State v. Thomas, 150 Wash. 2d 821, 848, 83 P.3d 970, 983–84
(2004) (holding that “there is a significant difference between a life sentence with parole and a
sentence of life without parole in the context of capital sentencing”).
222. 121 Wash. 2d 419, 853 P.2d 901.
223. Grisby, 121 Wash. 2d at 427, 853 P.2d at 905 (quoting Frampton, 95 Wash. 2d at 529–30,
627 P.2d at 952–53).
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harmless error analysis. 224
Similarly, in State v. Frampton, 225 a majority of the Court agreed with
Justice Dimmick’s concurrence that life without parole sentences and
life with parole sentences may be constitutionally indistinguishable in
certain circumstances. 226 The discretionary nature of parole and the
limited review available over parole decisions means that:
a defendant who pleads guilty and receives a life sentence with a
possibility of parole must expect he will serve a life sentence.
He will, in fact, serve the identical sentence as a defendant
who . . . was sentenced to life without possibility of parole;
unless the State deigns to exercise its discretion and mollify his
life sentence. 227
The Washington State Supreme Court recognized in this line of cases
that the mere possibility of parole may not substantially alter the
likelihood that an inmate will ever leave prison. The individual
circumstances of each case will determine whether a particular
defendant survives to see freedom. This is precisely the type of analysis
the United States Supreme Court required a court to undertake when
considering whether to sentence a child to life without parole.
The principle that the criminal justice system must treat children as
children extends beyond the life without parole sentencing context. In
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 228 the Court, citing Roper and Graham,
determined that different procedural rules apply when police interrogate
children. 229 Because “children cannot be viewed simply as miniature
adults,” the constitution requires that they be treated differently than
adult defendants facing police questioning. 230 The Supreme Court in
J.D.B. extended the rationale of Miller, Graham, and Roper and

224. Grisby, 121 Wash. 2d at 424–25, 853 P.2d at 903.
225. 95 Wash. 2d 469, 627 P.2d 922.
226. Frampton, 95 Wash. 2d at 529–30, 627 P.2d at 952–53 (Dimmick, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
227. Grisby, 121 Wash. 2d at 426–27, 853 P.2d at 905 (quoting Frampton, 95 Wash. 2d at 529–
30, 627 P.2d at 952–53).
228. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406 (2011).
229. Id. at 2403 (“Time and again, this Court has drawn these commonsense conclusions for
itself. We have observed that children generally are less mature and responsible than adults, that
they often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could
be detrimental to them, that they are more vulnerable or susceptible to outside pressures . . . than
adults, and so on.” (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 130 (2010) (internal quotations and other citations omitted)).
230. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2404 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982)).
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indicated that a child’s “chronological age and its hallmark features”231
are relevant in many different phases of the criminal justice system.
Consideration of the particular characteristics of youth at sentencing is
one of the most important of these principles.
Nonetheless, the Senate Bill provides sentencing courts with the
discretion to make individualized sentencing decisions only when an
older child is convicted of aggravated first degree murder, the most
serious charge available under Washington’s criminal code. The
legislature should promote good public policy and preempt legal
challenges to the Act by amending it to require individualized sentencing
in all cases where children face decades behind bars.
CONCLUSION
Science, legal principles, and societal norms all counsel against
condemning children to die in prison. During the last session, the
legislature took steps to mitigate the harsh, unnecessary consequences of
long-term extreme sentences imposed upon children. However, it
allowed courts to impose life without parole sentences under some
circumstances and did not require individualized sentencing hearings in
all cases where children face decades behind bars. The Washington State
Legislature should reexamine its reforms in order to treat all children
like children and provide all of them the real possibility of release.

231. Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012).
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APPENDIX A
Information Regarding People Serving Juvenile Life Without Parole in
Washington
Last Name

Age at
Crime

Year of
Crime

Year of
Sentencing

First Name

County

Alexander

Ryan

Whatcom

16

2002

2004

Anderson

David

King

17

1997

2000

Backstrom

Brandon

Snohomish

17

1997

1999

Baranyi

Alex

King

17

1997

1999

Bassett

Brian

Grays Harbor

16

1995

1996

Boot

Kevin

Spokane

17

1994

1996

Bourgeois

Jeremiah

King

14

1992

1993

Comeslast

Kenneth

Spokane

15

1995

1996

Delbosque

Cristian

Mason

17

1993

1994

Forrester

John Lee

Spokane

17

1976

1977

Furman

Michael

Kitsap

17

1989

1990

Gaitan

Miguel

Yakima

14

1993

1993

Gilbert

Jeremiah

Klickitat

15

1992

1993

Haag

Timothy

Cowlitz

17

1994

1995

Harris

Michael

Pierce

15

1987

1988

Hofstetter

Ansel

Pierce

16

1991

1992

Lambert

Donald

Grant

14

1997

1997

Lembcke

William

Stevens

16

2000

2001

Leo

Marvin

Pierce

17

1998

2000

Loukaitis

Barry

Grant

14

1996

1997

Massey

Barry

Pierce

13

1987

1988

McNeil

Russell

Yakima

17

1988

1989

Munguia

Jose

Benton

15

1997

1998

Ngoeung

Nga

Pierce

17

1994

1995

Phet

John

Pierce

16

1998

2002

Rice

Herbert

Yakima

17

1988

1990

Skay

Michael

Snohomish

16

1995

1996

Stevenson

Sean

Skamania

16

1987

1987

Thang

Vy

Spokane

17

1997

2003

Weaver

Terence

Whatcom

16

1996

1997

